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THE INDIGNITIES OF CIVIL LITIGATION
MATTHEW A. SHAPIRO

ABSTRACT
Dispute resolution has become increasingly shrouded in secrecy, with the
proliferation of protective orders in discovery, confidential settlement
agreements, and private arbitration. While many civil procedure scholars have
criticized this trend for undermining the systemic benefits of public adjudication,
the desirability of secrecy in civil litigation proves to be a much more
complicated question.
On the one hand, some of those same scholars have recently sought to justify
civil litigation in terms that, ironically, highlight the benefits of secrecy.
Although this new justification remains somewhat inchoate, it is best understood
as a claim that the procedures of civil litigation allow individual plaintiffs to
realize one aspect of their dignity—which this Article labels “dignity-asstatus”—by empowering them to call those who have allegedly wronged them
to account and to thereby reassert their standing as equals. The problem is that
civil litigation can also undermine another aspect of plaintiffs’ dignity—which
this Article labels “dignity-as-image”—by requiring them to divulge sensitive
personal information and thus to cede control over their public selfpresentation. Secrecy can help to preserve this second aspect of plaintiffs’
dignity.
On the other hand, secrecy can also deprive plaintiffs of a potentially
powerful expressive weapon in their quest to hold wrongdoers accountable. In
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conditions of socioeconomic inequality, weaker plaintiffs can sometimes turn the
humiliating aspects of civil litigation to their advantage, intentionally revealing
sensitive personal information that emphasizes their lower social status in order
to shame their more powerful adversaries. It turns out that civil litigation can
indeed promote plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status, but by affording them a venue in
which to deliberately compromise their dignity-as-image—to humiliate, as much
as ennoble, themselves.
Given the complex nature of dignity and the complex trade-off between
secrecy’s dignitarian benefits and costs, plaintiffs should be given more control
over how much of their personal information is disseminated beyond the
immediate parties to a lawsuit—a prescription with implications not only for
secrecy in civil litigation, but also potentially for several other prominent
procedural issues.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, dispute resolution has become increasingly shrouded in
secrecy.1 Many court filings are made under seal. Information is frequently
produced during discovery subject to protective orders that forbid disclosure to
the public. With the demise of the civil trial, few cases are adjudicated in open
court anymore; rather, most lawsuits now settle, with an increasing number of
settlement agreements requiring the parties to keep both the settlement terms and
the details of the dispute confidential. And an ever-greater share of civil disputes
never make it into court in the first place but are instead shunted to private
arbitration, where strict confidentiality rules can obscure both the proceedings
and the outcomes from public view.
One camp of civil procedure scholars has been especially vociferous in
decrying these trends. The scholars I have in mind are those who approach civil
litigation and dispute resolution more broadly from the perspective of “access to
justice.” In general, proponents of access to justice seek to make it easier for
victims of wrongdoing to pursue redress through the civil justice system. 2 Broad
access to courts, these scholars contend, not only helps victims themselves, but
also yields a host of systemic benefits, including development of legal doctrine, 3
deterrence of violations of substantive law,4 private enforcement of public

1
See Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented
Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1941 (2017) (“[A]lmost all court- and non-court-based dispute
resolution proceedings now occur behind closed doors.”). See generally Joseph W. Doherty,
Robert T. Reville & Laura Zakaras, Introduction to CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND
THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at xiii-xx (Joseph W. Doherty et al. eds., 2012) (identifying
social costs of decreased transparency in civil dispute resolution).
2
See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, CIVIL JUSTICE RECONSIDERED (2017) (criticizing
unequal access to legal remedies and proposing reforms); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE (2004) (making similar arguments for broader access to civil justice). For
representative statements of the orthodox access-to-justice positions on current issues in civil
procedure—including criticisms of recent developments in pleading, discovery, summary
judgment, class actions, and arbitration—see generally, for example, Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 193 (2014);
Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501 (2012); Arthur R.
Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections
on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013); A. Benjamin
Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010); and
Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014).
3
See, e.g., ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 63-64, 81-82 (2017) [hereinafter
LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION]; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
4
See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 9 (2010).
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regulatory regimes,5 and transparency about the activities of governmental
institutions and private businesses.6 Because these benefits largely depend on
the public nature of our civil justice system, access-to-justice scholars view
increased secrecy in civil litigation as a significant threat. They have, in
particular, opposed each of the developments noted above. Touting the
transparency benefits of discovery,7 access-to-justice scholars have criticized
practices that exclude information exchanged during discovery from the public
record,8 particularly protective orders.9 They have similarly faulted confidential
settlement agreements for suppressing information about wrongdoing.10 And
they have objected to arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution
(“ADR”) on the ground that those practices are largely insulated from public
scrutiny.11
In this Article, I argue that we should question this almost categorical
resistance to greater secrecy in civil litigation in light of a nascent normative
5
See, e.g., LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 38-41; Stephen B. Burbank,
Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637,
645-46 (2013).
6
See, e.g., LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 58-63.
7
See id.; Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY
L.J. 1657, 1683-86, 1689-90 (2016) [hereinafter Lahav, Roles of Litigation].
8
See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 657-58 (2005)
[hereinafter Resnik, Contract]; Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How
the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 55560 (2006) [hereinafter Resnik, Uncovering].
9
See Lahav, Roles of Litigation, supra note 7, at 1686-88. To be sure, other scholars who
might embrace the access-to-justice label have been less skeptical of protective orders and
other privacy-protecting measures in civil litigation. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, CourtOrdered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 357, 360 (2006); Richard L.
Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 470; Richard
L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (at Last) that the Federal Rules Do Not Declare
that Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 332 (2006) [hereinafter
Marcus, Modest Proposal]; Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public
Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 432 (1991). But over the last decade or so, their
position has been eclipsed by that of the secrecy skeptics.
10
See LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 75-79; Lahav, Roles of Litigation,
supra note 7, at 1688-89; David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83
GEO. L.J. 2619, 2650 (1995); Resnik, Contract, supra note 8, at 653-57.
11
See Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Economic
Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 605, 610, 640-46 (2018)
[hereinafter Resnik, Access]; Resnik, Contract, supra note 8, at 658-59; see also infra notes
194-97 and accompanying text (analyzing criticisms of the secrecy of arbitration). For an
argument connecting the trend toward greater secrecy in dispute resolution with changes in
courthouse architecture, see generally Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice:
Courthouse Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 311 (2012).

506

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:501

development within access-to-justice scholarship itself. Even as many accessto-justice scholars advocate greater publicity in the civil justice system, some of
those same scholars have also begun to gesture toward a justification for civil
litigation that, ironically, should prompt us to reconsider the benefits of greater
secrecy. This Article shows how that new justification only highlights the many
difficult trade-offs between publicity and secrecy in civil litigation that confront
the individual plaintiffs whose interests access-to-justice theory seeks to defend.
The upshot, I contend, is that publicity in civil litigation may well be worth
promoting, but for very different kinds of reasons from those that access-tojustice scholars have traditionally adduced—and at much greater personal cost
to individual plaintiffs than they have previously acknowledged.12
Access-to-justice scholarship has recently taken what this Article calls a
dignitarian turn. Rather than justify broad access to courts exclusively as a way
for victims to obtain remedies for their injuries, an increasing number of accessto-justice scholars cite certain benefits inherent in the litigation process itself. 13
This intrinsic defense of civil litigation remains undertheorized, with scholars
invoking myriad different values, including “democracy” and “equality.” 14 But
whatever the specific labels, these scholars are best understood to be coalescing
around the same basic claim: that the procedures of civil litigation—from
pleading to discovery to adjudication—allow victims of wrongdoing to hold
those who have (allegedly)15 wronged them accountable by demanding
explanations for their injuries and, in doing so, to reassert their standing as full
and equal members of society. This Article’s first contribution is to identify and

12

This Article follows most access-to-justice scholarship in taking as the paradigmatic
lawsuit one in which a weaker plaintiff (usually an individual or group of individuals) is suing
a more powerful defendant (often a corporation or other entity). See, e.g., sources cited supra
note 2 (collecting representative statements of access-to-justice scholars). That assumption is,
of course, somewhat artificial, given the possibility of manipulating the party alignment
through the joinder rules and declaratory-judgment remedy. Moreover, many civil procedure
scholars have rightly called attention to lawsuits, such as debt-collection actions, in which the
weaker party typically appears as the defendant. See, e.g., ACLU, A Pound of Flesh: The
Criminalization of Private Debt, in ABILITY TO PAY 112, 113 (Judith Resnik et al. eds., 2019)
(“Once a [debt-collection] lawsuit is filed, the process is stacked against defendants, the
overwhelming majority of whom are not represented by an attorney.”). While I don’t mean to
deny the normative significance of those other kinds of lawsuits, access-to-justice theory has
developed around the weak-plaintiff/powerful-defendant paradigm, and so this Article, too,
assumes that admittedly simplified lineup as it seeks to complicate the anti-secrecy arguments
of many access-to-justice scholars.
13
See infra Section I.A.1.
14
See, e.g., infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (describing one scholar’s invocation
of these values).
15
I’ll assume this caveat in the rest of the Article.
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more fully develop this new defense of civil litigation, which I argue is best
understood as resting on a particular conception of dignity.16
The dignitarian turn embodies what strikes me as a normatively appealing (if
somewhat idealized) vision of the role civil litigation can play in our society.
And while access-to-justice scholars defend publicity in civil litigation primarily
on various consequentialist grounds, the dignitarian turn does seem to bolster
their case. The problem, though, is that dignity is a multifaceted concept,
comprising several different values and concerns.17 Some access-to-justice
scholars have implicitly latched on to one particular facet—what I’ll call dignityas-status—to justify certain features of our civil justice system. 18 But there are
other facets of dignity, some of which can cut in different directions than dignityas-status. Dignity’s variegated nature, in other words, necessitates making tradeoffs not only between dignity and other values, but also within the concept of
dignity itself.19 And indeed, this Article shows that a status-based dignitarian
defense of civil litigation runs up against certain central features of lawsuits that
seem equally to implicate dignitarian interests, but in less attractive ways. 20 If
we’re going to follow recent access-to-justice scholarship in trying to understand
civil litigation in dignitarian terms, as I think we should, then we must be willing
to recognize the undignified aspects of prosecuting a lawsuit along with the
dignified ones. The role of dignity in civil litigation, this Article reveals, turns
out to be much more complicated than the recent rhetoric of access-to-justice
scholars seems to suggest.
After expounding the dignitarian turn in access-to-justice scholarship, this
Article focuses on one particularly thorny complication. Another prominent
notion of dignity—what I’ll call dignity-as-image—associates the concept with
privacy.21 Of course, privacy, like dignity, is a notoriously heterogeneous idea.22
But according to one of its core meanings, privacy includes a degree of control
over how much of one’s personal information is revealed to others.23 This sense
16
See infra Section I.A.2. I explain the relationship between this new development and
Professor Jerry Mashaw’s earlier dignitarian theory of procedure infra note 39 and
accompanying text.
17
To recognize this variegation isn’t to concede that the concept is “vacuous.” Contra
Mirko Bagaric & James Allan, The Vacuous Concept of Dignity, 5 J. HUM. RTS. 257, 260
(2006); Ruth Macklin, Dignity Is a Useless Concept, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 1419, 1419 (2003);
Stephen Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 2008, at 28, 30. A concept
is neither meaningless nor “useless” simply because it’s multivocal.
18
See infra Section I.A.
19
Cf. David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 227 (2016)
(making similar point about privacy).
20
See infra Part II.
21
See infra Section II.A.
22
See Pozen, supra note 19, at 225-27 (discussing various conflicting understandings of
“privacy”).
23
See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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of privacy relates back to dignity, which is commonly thought to involve the
ability to shape one’s public image or self-presentation. Secrecy might actually
safeguard this aspect of plaintiffs’ dignity, by allowing them to withhold
personal information they’d rather not share and thus to avoid humiliation—
understood specifically as the revelation of personal information that is
inconsistent with the public image one wishes to project.24
Civil litigation can, in this sense, be a humiliating affair for plaintiffs.25
Indeed, the very same procedures that allow plaintiffs to assert their dignity-asstatus can also compromise their dignity-as-image. To prosecute a lawsuit,
plaintiffs must publicly proclaim themselves to be victims, recount every minute
detail of their injuries in court filings, disclose a wealth of personal information
(much of it only tangentially related to the issues in the case) during discovery,
and put much of that information on public display at summary judgment or trial.
At nearly every turn, civil litigation requires plaintiffs to reveal personal
information that potentially undermines their public image. Not all plaintiffs, of
course, will experience this public exposure as humiliating; some will consider
it unobjectionable or even empowering. But many plaintiffs will recoil from the
scrutiny, especially once defendants begin to use the tools of discovery to pry
into parts of their lives that have little bearing on their legal claims. Civil
litigation presents such plaintiffs with a trade-off between their dignity-as-status
and dignity-as-image. Given these indignities of civil litigation, plaintiffs may
ultimately be able to reclaim their dignity through civil litigation, as some
access-to-justice scholars now suggest, but often only at the cost of being
humiliated in the process.
Civil litigation’s humiliating potential unsettles both the dignitarian turn and
access-to-justice scholars’ nearly absolute opposition to secrecy in civil
procedure. Any dignitarian defense of civil litigation must also account for its
substantial dignitarian costs, which render the prospect of prosecuting a lawsuit
much less appealing than the dignitarian turn implies. And in light of those costs,
procedural secrecy begins to look more attractive: because protective orders,
confidential settlement agreements, and secret arbitral proceedings can all
protect privacy and thereby prevent humiliation, dignitarian theory would seem
to strengthen the case for each of those controversial procedural practices. At
the very least, if we’re to take access-to-justice scholars’ dignitarian claims
seriously, then we can no longer reject secrecy in civil litigation based on the
systemic benefits of publicity alone, without considering the significant
dignitarian costs of publicity for the individual plaintiffs whom access-to-justice
theory purports to champion.

24

See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
Civil litigation can, of course, also be humiliating for defendants. But because the
dignitarian turn in access-to-justice scholarship emphasizes civil litigation’s dignitarian
benefits for plaintiffs, this Article correspondingly focuses on the dignitarian costs for
plaintiffs and, except for a brief discussion in Part III, brackets the (potentially significant)
dignitarian effects of civil litigation for defendants.
25
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Dignity’s equivocal quality also potentially complicates standard access-tojustice positions on issues that, at first glance, seem to have little to do with
dignity. Across several prominent areas of civil procedure, access-to-justice
scholars broadly agree about which policies empower plaintiffs and which ones
don’t. It would thus seem to be relatively straightforward to determine which of
those policies promote plaintiffs’ dignity and which ones don’t. But given
dignity’s multifaceted nature, the dignitarian valence of those issues becomes
more ambiguous, with any given policy having the potential to simultaneously
realize one aspect of plaintiffs’ dignity and undermine another. This isn’t to
suggest that access-to-justice scholars are necessarily wrong to suppose that
certain policies benefit or harm plaintiffs, all things considered; a complete
normative analysis may well reveal a policy’s consequences for other values to
outweigh its dignitarian effects. Rather, before we can characterize a particular
procedural policy as dignity enhancing or dignity compromising, we must
account for the image-based aspect of dignity as well as the status-based aspect
recently emphasized by proponents of the dignitarian turn.
In short, the dignitarian turn ends up putting pressure on the anti-secrecy
consensus among access-to-justice scholars, while revealing a neglected, if
ambiguous, dignitarian dimension to several prominent procedural debates.
But there’s a twist. It might at first seem obvious that plaintiffs should try to
shield themselves from humiliation during civil litigation—all the more so
according to the dignitarian premises recently embraced by access-to-justice
scholars.26 Implicit in the dignitarian turn is the idea that, by enabling plaintiffs
to reassert their dignity against anyone who has wronged them, the procedures
of civil litigation help to maintain legal equality amid socioeconomic inequality.
Just by filing a complaint, even the weakest members of society can demand
answers from the most powerful. Or so the dignitarian turn suggests.27 On this
view, humiliation seems to have no place in a lawsuit: if plaintiffs maintain legal
equality by reasserting their dignity, and if humiliation undermines dignity, then

26
See infra note 156 and accompanying text (identifying various dignitarian costs of
prosecuting a lawsuit).
27
See, e.g., Lahav, Roles of Litigation, supra note 7, at 1667 (“[L]itigation allows
individuals, even the most downtrodden, to obtain recognition from a governmental officer (a
judge) of their claims.”); Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite—The
Norman Shachoy Lecture, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 807 (2008) [hereinafter Resnik, Courts]
(dubbing courts the “great levelers”); see also infra note 46 and accompanying text (collecting
sources making similar claims); cf. Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort
Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 101 (2010) (“We are not long past the days when society was
stratified, such that people in superior classes had no obligation to answer to those inferior[,
but n]ow we allow plaintiffs to demand answers of virtually anyone, merely upon notice
pleading.”); Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of
Arbitration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 279, 295 (“From Nixon to
Enron, the court of law is the great equalizer in a democracy.”).
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plaintiffs should, to the extent possible, spare themselves from the indignities of
civil litigation.
Against this intuitive logic, I defend the counterintuitive conclusion that there
is often good (though by no means decisive) reason for plaintiffs not to protect
themselves from humiliation—even (or especially) if we think that civil
litigation plays an important role in maintaining legal equality. It turns out that
humiliation can, paradoxically, help to promote legal equality, rather than
undermine it, in nonideal social conditions. Drawing on the literature on the
expressive effects of social practices, this Article shows that plaintiffs can turn
the humiliating aspects of civil litigation to their advantage.28 By choosing to
humiliate themselves—by revealing personal information that emphasizes their
lower social status and thus undermines their preferred self-presentation—
weaker plaintiffs can shame their more powerful adversaries, countering a
defendant’s social superiority with a form of moral superiority. Such shaming
cannot, of course, guarantee that weaker plaintiffs will win their lawsuits; it
won’t necessarily move defendants or sway judges or juries. But it can take
defendants down a peg on the moral hierarchy, making it socially untenable for
them to simply brush aside plaintiffs’ demands for answers. In an unequal
society such as ours, that kind of moral leveling can help to offset some of the
advantages enjoyed by socially stronger parties. Civil litigation, I suggest,
promotes legal equality in the face of social inequality by affording plaintiffs a
venue in which not only to ennoble, but also to humiliate, themselves—and to
drag more powerful defendants down with them.
Appreciating this expressive dimension of civil litigation has important
doctrinal implications. Most significantly, it offers a new justification for
publicity in civil litigation that turns the standard access-to-justice justification
on its head. Access-to-justice scholars oppose protective orders, confidential
settlement agreements, and private arbitration primarily because such secrecy
stymies various systemic benefits associated with transparency, benefits that
sometimes require plaintiffs to sacrifice their privacy and dignity for the greater
good.29 This Article, by contrast, shows that secrecy has a potential downside
for plaintiffs, too: by shielding themselves from humiliation, plaintiffs may
actually make it even harder to reclaim their dignity, forgoing the chance to
shame defendants and to thereby raise the moral stakes of their disputes.
This isn’t to say that plaintiffs should be forced to humiliate themselves
during civil litigation. Self-humiliation may help plaintiffs to reassert their
dignity-as-status, but often only at considerable cost to their dignity-as-image.
Given this delicate trade-off, plaintiffs should be afforded more latitude to
decide how best to weigh one aspect of their dignity against the other. One
possibility for institutionalizing this choice would be a qualified humiliation
privilege. Such a privilege would allow plaintiffs (subject to judicial review) to
withhold from the public record sensitive personal information that would be
28
29

See infra Section III.B.
See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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humiliating if publicly disclosed; such information would be disseminated
beyond the immediate parties to a lawsuit only if the plaintiff either assented to
public disclosure or opted to make the underlying events to which the
information pertained part of his or her affirmative case. Plaintiffs could thus
choose between keeping the information private, thereby preserving their
dignity-as-image but potentially hindering their attempt to reassert their dignityas-status, and publicizing it, thereby amplifying their claim to dignity-as-status
but potentially compromising their dignity-as-image.
If civil litigation can have significant expressive effects, then we should also
reconsider procedural rules that, even if not directly concerned with publicity
and secrecy, still have the potential to shape the social meaning of a lawsuit. A
given rule may turn out to either facilitate or stymie plaintiffs’ self-humiliation
and thus to either augment or dampen defendants’ shame. To be sure, any
procedural rule will have material as well as expressive effects, and we shouldn’t
focus on one set of effects to the exclusion of the other. But we may be able to
adjust a rule in ways that bolster its expressive force without sacrificing its
material benefits. This Article tentatively considers some possible adjustments
along those lines in several procedural contexts.30
Finally, recognizing the complex role of dignity in civil litigation yields an
important theoretical insight. The conventional view in political and legal theory
has long been that the ideal of equality before the law requires judicial blindness
to differences of social status—just think of the ubiquitous image of a
blindfolded Lady Justice. But it may well be that, in conditions of socioeconomic
inequality, attending to, and even highlighting, differences of social status can
promote legal equality, by helping to level the playing field between socially
weaker and more powerful parties.31
30

See infra Section III.B.
This insight links this Article’s concerns with the burgeoning literature on the
implications of socioeconomic inequality for civil procedure and for public law.
For recent scholarship considering the implications of socioeconomic inequality for civil
procedure, see, for example, Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1005, 1015-29 (2016) (arguing that civil procedure is constructed by and for those in top one
percent of income distribution); Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of LowIncome Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1539-50 (2016) (arguing that
restrictions on aggregate litigation disproportionately harm low-income individuals); and
Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. 1478, 1497-505
(2019) (identifying efficiency and privacy concerns associated with current in forma pauperis
practice).
For recent scholarship considering the implications of socioeconomic inequality for public
law, see, for example, K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 85 (2017)
(“[T]he [modern] collection of background laws . . . give[s] rise to aggregate effects of
economic unfreedom.”); GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS
CONSTITUTION 237 (2017) (drawing connections between political and economic inequality);
Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18
31
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The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I reconstructs the dignitarian turn in
access-to-justice scholarship. Part II identifies some of the ways in which civil
litigation can prove humiliating for plaintiffs and considers the cross-cutting
dignitarian effects of several aspects of civil procedure. Part III then further
complicates the normative valence of the various procedural practices
considered in Part II, revealing how humiliating oneself can shame one’s
adversary and contemplating how certain procedural rules might be modified to
better account for the expressive dimension of civil litigation.
I.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE DIGNITARIAN TURN

One of the most pressing challenges currently facing civil procedure scholars
is to defend the distinctive value of civil litigation in the era of the “vanishing
civil trial.”32 If a lawsuit is typically a mere prelude to settlement, then what role
do the procedures of civil litigation serve that could not be equally fulfilled by
various types of ADR? The imperative to justify the continued relevance of civil
litigation is especially urgent for those scholars who subscribe to access-tojustice theory, which tends to valorize public, court-based adjudication and to
resist attempts to channel private disputes into private forms of dispute
resolution, particularly arbitration.33
A possible response to this challenge would be to reemphasize the various
systemic benefits associated with public adjudication—private enforcement, law

U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419, 438 (2015) (“As economic inequality has soared, so too has political
inequality.”); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 669, 671 (2014) (“The constitutional problem of oligarchy is the danger that
concentrations of economic power and political power may be mutually reinforcing.”); Joseph
Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An Introduction
to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Equality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 129092 (2016) (evaluating what kind of political economy accords with U.S. Constitution);
Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 195, 198-202 (criticizing recent First Amendment decisions
for prioritizing economic liberty over economic equality); and Bertrall L. Ross, II & Su Li,
Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
323, 343-47 (2016) (arguing that the poor enjoy limited political power).
32
Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked for, Getting What We Paid for, and Not
Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 954 (2004);
see also, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012) (“[I]n American civil justice, we have gone from a world in which
trials . . . were routine, to a world in which trials have become ‘vanishingly rare.’” (quoting
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 51 (1996))).
33
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1821-22 (2014)
(criticizing opacity of private dispute resolution).
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declaration, transparency, and so on34—and to argue that those benefits are
substantially realized even by the intermediate stages of a lawsuit preceding a
final merits decision but are largely forgone by ADR. Several scholars have
indeed taken this tack.35 Alongside that instrumentalist defense, however, some
access-to-justice scholars have also begun to ascribe intrinsic value to civil
litigation—value apart from its contribution to broader systemic goals. These
scholars seem to contend that the procedures of civil litigation, whatever their
further consequences, help to constitute certain kinds of valuable social relations
among the members of the political community. 36 This Part will argue that this
new defense of civil litigation is best understood as resting on a particular
conception of dignity.
Drawing on recent work in moral and political philosophy on the concept of
dignity, Section I.A sympathetically reconstructs the dignitarian turn in accessto-justice scholarship. Section I.B then attempts to delimit the scope—in terms
of claims and parties—of this new dignitarian defense of civil litigation.
A.

Dignity in Civil Litigation

The connection between dignity and civil litigation could, of course, itself be
purely instrumental. Just as many civil procedure scholars contend that civil
litigation yields various systemic benefits, so one might think that dignity is yet
another good that a lawsuit can promote. On this view, dignity is achieved
through civil litigation, when courts recognize the validity of plaintiffs’ legal
claims and vindicate their rights by granting them their requested relief.37 Such
34

See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 507, 541-54 (2011) (arguing that civil litigation generally realizes various
instrumental benefits); Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of
Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1180-84, 1201-02 (2009) (identifying instrumental
benefits of aggregate settlement); Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055, 1061 (2015) (showing how discovery can call organizations’
attention to internal problems). Another response would be to curb settlement, see, e.g., Owen
M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984), or to revive the civil jury trial,
see, e.g., SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY 5 (2016). Such proposals, however,
face significant, if not insurmountable, practical hurdles.
36
See infra Section I.A.
37
Scott Hershovitz’s “expressivist” account of tort law can be understood in these terms.
Hershovitz contends that “tort law is an expressive institution” in the sense that a tort
judgment “public[ly] vindicat[es]” the plaintiff by “reassert[ing] that [she] had a right not to
be treated the way she was.” Scott Hershovitz, The Search for a Grand Unified Theory of Tort
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 942, 967 (2017) (book review); see also Scott Hershovitz, Treating
Wrongs as Wrongs: An Expressive Argument for Tort Law, 10 J. TORT L. 1, 10 (2018)
[hereinafter Hershovitz, Wrongs] (arguing that tort damages awards communicate message
that defendant’s conduct was wrong); cf. Avihay Dorfman, What Is the Point of the Tort
Remedy?, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 105, 131-33 (2010) (ascribing similar expressive value to tort
35
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an account, however, confronts the same problem as any other instrumentalist
defense of civil litigation: as ever fewer cases are fully adjudicated on the merits,
it becomes increasingly difficult to justify civil litigation according to its
capacity to remedy plaintiffs’ injuries and to deliver any concomitant benefits.
The dignitarian turn in access-to-justice scholarship can be understood partly
as a response to this problem. If plaintiffs often can’t depend on civil litigation
to provide meaningful relief—not even the dignitarian relief implicit in the
award of a remedy for one’s injuries—then what’s the point of filing a lawsuit?
The answer recently given by several civil procedure scholars, this Section
shows, is to see the procedures of civil litigation as partially constitutive of
dignity, rather than as merely instrumental to it.38 Dignity, an increasing number
of scholars suggest, is realized not only through civil litigation, but also in civil
litigation. And if that’s so, then civil litigation has value independent of the
specific outcome of any given lawsuit, let alone any broader systemic benefits
that might attend it.
To be sure, the general idea of an intrinsic connection between dignity and
procedure isn’t new. More than three decades ago, Professor Jerry Mashaw
argued that respect for individuals’ dignity requires certain procedural
protections, such as notice and an opportunity to be heard, in the context of
administrative adjudication—quite apart from any tendency of such procedures
to increase the accuracy of governmental decision-making.39 But the dignitarian
turn in recent access-to-justice scholarship differs from this earlier dignitarian
theory of procedure in both object and substance. In terms of object, whereas
Mashaw saw procedure as an aspect of the state’s duty to respect its citizens’
dignity, the dignitarian turn sees procedure as one important venue in which

judgments); Stephen Smith, Why Courts Make Orders (and What This Tells Us About
Damages), 64 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 51, 77, 84 (2011) (identifying communicative content
of damages awards). On this view, civil litigation is instrumental to the dignitarian value
implicit in tort judgments.
38
Cf. John Gardner, What Is Tort Law for? Part I. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30
LAW & PHIL. 1, 2 (2011) (distinguishing instrumental from intrinsic, or “teleological,”
accounts of tort law).
39
See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158-253 (1985);
Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L.
REV. 885, 894 (1981) [hereinafter Mashaw, Administrative]; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme
Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-52 (1976); see also, e.g.,
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1173-75 (arguing that dignity requires effective
court access). For a trenchant critique of Mashaw’s attempt to ascribe intrinsic, dignitarian
value to procedures independent of the outcomes they yield, see Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to
Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L.
REV. 485, 509 (2003).
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citizens maintain their dignity vis-à-vis one another.40 As for substance, Mashaw
espoused a conception of dignity as inherent moral worth, rooted in persons’
rational capacities; hence his emphasis on the value of being able to participate
in governmental decisions that affect one’s interests.41 We’ll see that the
dignitarian turn, by contrast, reflects a more political conception of dignity as
high social status, an essential component of which is the standing to call others
to account for the wrongs one has suffered.42
In this Section, I’ll first examine the connection that some access-to-justice
scholars have begun to draw between the various procedures of civil litigation
and the ability of individuals to call others to account, in the sense of demanding
answers from those who have wronged them. I’ll then situate this notion of
accountability in recent philosophical scholarship on dignity, particularly
Professor Jeremy Waldron’s work developing a status-based conception.43
40

See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
See Mashaw, Administrative, supra note 39, at 902-04.
42
See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
43
At both steps of the argument, I’ll also draw, in the footnotes, on a parallel development
in torts scholarship known as “civil recourse theory.” Civil recourse theory’s core claim is
“that a person who is wronged, but deprived by law of the ability to respond directly, is
entitled to an avenue of civil recourse against the wrongdoer.” John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A Reply to Posner, Calabresi, Rustad,
Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J. 569, 573 (2013). Several civil recourse theorists have
explicitly grounded this principle in values closely related to dignity. See, e.g., Nathan B.
Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 59-60 (2011) [hereinafter Oman,
Honor] (defending civil recourse as way of vindicating one’s honor); Jason M. Solomon, Civil
Recourse as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243, 259-61 (2011) (defending civil
recourse as way of maintaining social equality); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing,
Civil Recourse, and Corrective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 299, 323-40 (2011) [hereinafter
Zipursky, Substantive Standing] (defending civil recourse as means of self-restoration).
Although civil recourse was originally developed as a theory of tort law, its main tenets
apply equally to other areas of private law, as both its critics and proponents have
acknowledged. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 271-72 (2016) (analyzing property
and contract in terms of civil recourse); John Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, 39 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 43, 50-52 (2011) (analyzing law of equitable wrongs in terms of civil recourse);
Ori J. Herstein, How Tort Law Empowers, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 99, 109 (2015) (“Th[e] power
to expose others to the power of courts is, of course, a general feature of civil litigation, which
is not restrictive to the context of tort victims and tortfeasors, but mostly available to all
would-be plaintiffs.”); Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of
Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529, 533 (2011) [hereinafter Oman, Consent]
(applying civil recourse theory to contract law); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 734 (2003) (“Private rights of action are, of course,
found in innumerable areas of the law—not only in torts, but in contracts, property, and
throughout statutory schemes that implicitly or explicitly recognize private rights of action.”).
That’s unsurprising, for the “avenue of civil recourse” to which victims of wrongdoing are
entitled is as much a creature of trans-substantive rules of civil procedure as it is one of
41
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1. Civil Litigation and Accountability
The core claim of what I’m calling the “dignitarian turn” might at first seem
trivial but proves to be quite profound. As Professor Alexandra Lahav recently
put it, civil litigation empowers people “to call others who they believe have
wronged them to account.”44 Or, expressing the same point from the defendant’s
perspective, civil litigation “requir[es] wrongdoers to answer for their
conduct.”45 Civil litigation, in short, provides a forum in which we can hold
substance-specific doctrines of private law. See generally Matthew A. Shapiro, Civil Wrongs
and Civil Procedure, in CIVIL WRONGS AND JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW 87 (Paul B. Miller &
John Oberdiek eds., 2020). Insofar as civil recourse theory defends the right of victims to sue
wrongdoers in dignitarian terms, it resonates with the dignitarian turn in access-to-justice
scholarship.
44
Lahav, Roles of Litigation, supra note 7, at 1690; see also LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF
LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 32 (“Answerability allows a person to call someone they think
has done them wrong into court to answer for what they did.”); Gillian K. Hadfield & Dan
Ryan, Democracy, Courts and the Information Order, 54 EUR. J. SOC. 67, 83-84 (2013) (“It
is . . . no small thing to be recognized by the community as holding an entitlement—as an
equal—to demand at least an initial accounting and to have available a public institution that
is required to recognize and enforce this entitlement.”); cf. Leslie Bender, Tort Law’s Role as
a Tool for Social Justice Struggle, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 249, 259 (1998) [hereinafter Bender,
Tort Law’s Role] (arguing that tort law is especially empowering for victims of “social
injustice and dignitary harms,” whether or not they secure monetary remedies); John C.P.
Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the
Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 607 (2005) (claiming that tort law involves literal
empowerment of victims by conferring standing to demand response); John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 981 (2010) (emphasizing fact
that tort law empowers victims to hale others into court as matter of right); Jason M. Solomon,
Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 1797 (2009) (arguing that
tort law promotes mutual accountability).
45
Lahav, Roles of Litigation, supra note 7, at 1667; see also LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF
LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 8 (“Requiring that alleged wrongdoers publicly defend
themselves and answer for their conduct is also crucial to a system of laws.”); Hadfield &
Ryan, supra note 44, at 90 (describing civil litigation as “an arena in which those [whom]
plaintiffs perceive as responsible for their harms are required to treat them as an equal other,
entitled to disclosure of information that is relevant to their legal claim”); cf. Stephen Darwall
& Julian Darwall, Civil Recourse as Mutual Accountability, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17, 18
(2011); Hershovitz, supra note 27, at 99; Solomon, supra note 44, at 1798-811. Each of the
latter three articles draws on pure moral theory, particularly Professor Stephen Darwall’s work
on the interpersonal nature of moral obligation. Cf. MARGARET GILBERT, RIGHTS AND
DEMANDS: A FOUNDATIONAL INQUIRY 4 (2018) (developing similar account of rights as
involving standing to make demands). See generally STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECONDPERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2006). As the next Section
shows, however, the kind of accountability realized in civil litigation is better understood as
being grounded in a principle of political morality. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, All Kings in the
Kingdom of Ends? Republic and Dignity in Kant’s Practical Philosophy 13 (N.Y. Univ. Sch.
of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 18-39, 2018),
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others accountable, by demanding answers from those we think have wronged
us. Although we tend to take this feature of civil litigation for granted, it reflects
the fact that we all possess a remarkable legal power: simply by filing a lawsuit,
anyone, however weak, can accuse anyone else, however powerful, and compel
at least some kind of response.46
Of course, if this notion of accountability is understood to require an actual
remedy for a plaintiff’s injuries, our civil justice system fails to realize it in a
substantial number of cases. Many injured parties, after all, come away from
their lawsuits with no relief of any kind, much less a formal remedy. And even
when plaintiffs do manage to obtain some relief, that doesn’t always translate
into meaningful accountability on the part of the defendant, given widespread
practices that attenuate the connection between the relief and any recognition of
the defendant’s responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries, such as disclaimers of
wrongdoing in settlements47 and liability insurance.48
Short of remedying plaintiffs’ injuries, however, the procedures of civil
litigation provide numerous opportunities for plaintiffs to hold defendants
accountable in the sense recently used by access-to-justice scholars.49 Indeed,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3207754
[https://perma.cc/BV4R77ZZ] (distinguishing two notions of dignity in Kant’s moral thought and pronouncing one
“more of a political idea”). See generally BENNETT W. HELM, COMMUNITIES OF RESPECT:
GROUNDING RESPONSIBILITY, AUTHORITY, AND DIGNITY (2017) (developing “social”
understanding of mutual accountability).
46
See, e.g., Hadfield & Ryan, supra note 44, at 90 (noting “obligation of even the powerful
corporate officer to account to anyone who perceives him or herself to have been harmed by
that entity or against anyone whom the corporation seeks to enforce its claims, no matter how
poor or powerless”); Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA
L. REV. 1494, 1521 (2013) [hereinafter Lahav, Symmetry] (“Whatever their relative power
outside the courtroom, parties are entitled to equal treatment before the court, to equal use of
procedural devices that permit them to obtain hidden information, to call their opponent to
account for wrongdoing, and to assert their legal rights in public.”); Alexander A. Reinert,
The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767, 1785 (2014) (arguing that civil litigation
“reinforc[es] a democratic norm of equal accountability”); Resnik, Courts, supra note 27, at
806 (“[A]djudication is itself a democratic practice—an odd moment in which individuals can
oblige others to treat them as equals as they argue—in public—about alleged misbehavior and
wrongdoing. Litigation forces dialogue upon the unwilling . . . , and momentarily alters
configurations of authority.”); cf. Hershovitz, supra note 27, at 102 (arguing that the
institution of tort “gives ordinary folks the right to hale virtually anyone into court”).
47
See R.A. Duff, Repairing Harms and Answering for Wrongs, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 212, 222-23 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).
48
See id. at 226. But see Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance:
From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1414-15 (2013)
(arguing that insurance companies indirectly regulate, and thereby promote greater
accountability on part of insured parties).
49
Cf. R.A. Duff, Moral and Criminal Responsibility: Answering and Refusing to Answer,
in 5 OXFORD STUDIES IN AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY 165, 165-73 (D. Justin Coates & Neal
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are replete with formal mechanisms for
exercising the power to call others to account. Anyone can file a complaint,
which not only commences the lawsuit50 but also formally accuses the named
defendant and “demand[s] . . . relief.”51 The plaintiff can then compel the
defendant to respond: upon filing the complaint, the plaintiff can obtain a
summons commanding the defendant to appear in court, on pain of default. 52
After being served with the summons, the defendant must file either an answer
denying the allegations in the complaint53 or a pre-answer motion to dismiss the
complaint altogether.54 But either way, the defendant must acknowledge the
plaintiff’s claims and offer an initial response. If the plaintiff’s complaint
survives the defendant’s motion to dismiss, then the case proceeds to discovery,
where the plaintiff can elicit even more extensive answers from the defendant
through compulsory oral depositions, written interrogatories, and document
requests.55 And in those rare cases that make it past summary judgment, the
plaintiff can directly confront the defendant in open court at trial. 56 The Rules
thus repeatedly empower plaintiffs to demand an explanation from the
defendant—and to compel a response if the defendant proves recalcitrant.
To be sure, it will often be plaintiffs’ lawyers, rather than plaintiffs
themselves, demanding answers at each of these procedural stages (though many
plaintiffs proceed pro se, and so exercise the power to call others to account
directly). But the mediated nature of that demand doesn’t necessarily diminish—
and may even amplify—its force. For one thing, powerful defendants will take
a complaint or discovery request more seriously if it’s drafted by a lawyer rather
than a pro se litigant. For another, notwithstanding the Federal Rules’ abolition
of the common law “forms of action,”57 plaintiffs still must articulate their
demands for answers in legally cognizable terms, which requires a degree of
sophistication that many plaintiffs lack.58 It is ultimately still the plaintiffs

A. Tognazzini eds., 2019) (distinguishing concepts of “answerability” and “liability” in
criminal law).
50
See FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
51
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3).
52
FED. R. CIV. P. 4, 55.
53
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)-(c), 12(a).
54
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
55
FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37; cf. Hershovitz, supra note 27, at 72 (noting that some individuals
pursue tort litigation merely to obtain discovery); Solomon, supra note 43, at 260.
56
FED. R. CIV. P. 43.
57
FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
58
See LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 88-90; David Luban, Lawyers as
Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
815, 819; Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Towards an Understanding of Litigation as Expression:
Lessons from Guantanamo, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1497 (2011). See generally DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007).
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calling their opponents to account, even if they’re relying on lawyers to speak
on their behalf.
In emphasizing the ways in which civil litigation empowers plaintiffs to
demand answers from defendants, access-to-justice scholars ascribe intrinsic
value to civil litigation, value apart from the ultimate outcome of a given case.
For plaintiffs need not win their lawsuits in order to accuse a defendant and elicit
a response. To again quote Lahav: “Even if a party loses his case, the fact that
he can assert his claim and require both a government official and the person
who has wronged him to respond is a significant form of recognition of his
dignity.”59 On this view, civil litigation doesn’t simply promote some value
external to it, such as justice or efficiency; it also partially constitutes valuable
relations between the members of the political community by empowering
everyone to call anyone else to account.60 Because plaintiffs can substantially
exercise that power without obtaining a formal remedy from the court, it
provides a strong reason for broad access to civil justice even in the era of the
disappearing civil trial.
2. Accountability and Dignity
Access-to-justice scholars associate the notion of accountability realized in
civil litigation with several other, more fundamental values. For example, even
as Lahav contends that empowering people to call others to account respects
their “dignity,”61 she also invokes “equality,”62 and subsumes both under the
broader heading of “democracy.” 63 Notwithstanding the shifting terminology,
59
Lahav, Roles of Litigation, supra note 7, at 1667-68; see also Hadfield & Ryan, supra
note 44, at 84 (“Even the dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim requires the
defendant to respond, if only to explain why the complaint fails.”); cf. Hershovitz, supra note
27, at 110 (“In the end, we may be held liable, but before that, we are held answerable.”).
60
See Hadfield & Ryan, supra note 44, at 82 (arguing that civil litigation has “noninstrumental value” because of its “role in the constitution and maintenance of the experience
of equality in a democratic society”).
61
See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION,
supra note 3, at 32 (“[L]itigation affirms the values of autonomy and human dignity.”); Judith
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts,
and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2808, 2825 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes] (describing courts as “venues obliged to recognize the juridical personhood of all
persons and to accord them equal dignity”).
62
See LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 140 (“The idea that people should
receive equal treatment in the court system is well established and long recognized. It is based
in a deeper ideal that characterizes modern democracy: the ideal of status equality.”).
63
See, e.g., id. at 1; Lahav, Roles of Litigation, supra note 7, at 1683-90 (arguing that civil
litigation contributes to well-functioning democracy by promoting transparency); see also
Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of
Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917, 938 (2012) [hereinafter
Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements] (describing adjudication as a “democratic process”);
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however, I believe that the new accountability-based defense of civil litigation
is indeed best understood as a dignitarian claim.64
To be able to hold others accountable is to enjoy a certain kind of status in
society, a status that political philosophers have recently cashed out in terms of
dignity. As some access-to-justice scholars have emphasized, because our
various substantive rights wouldn’t amount to much if we couldn’t call one
another to account for violating them, being able to hold others accountable is
an essential part of what it means to be a full, rights-bearing member of society;
the right to call others to account is a foundational “right to have rights.” 65 This
claim has a certain egalitarian resonance—sounding not in distributive equality,
which concerns the distribution of benefits and burdens among the members of
society, but in social equality, the vision of a “society of equals.”66 And indeed,
access-to-justice scholars have invoked the ideal of equal social status to justify
affording everyone the power to call others to account.67 But to say we all enjoy
equal status isn’t to say much about the actual content of that status, which is
where the value of dignity comes in.
In suggesting that equal social status includes the power to call others to
account, access-to-justice scholars echo the status-based account of dignity
recently developed by Waldron. Although dignity is used in many different
Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 168 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness
in Numbers] (arguing that adjudication instantiates “democratic norms”).
64
Other elements of Lahav’s defense of civil litigation, such as her claim that it promotes
political “deliberation,” are more directly connected to democratic self-government. L AHAV,
IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 84-111; see also, e.g., David Marcus, Finding the
Civil Trial’s Democratic Future After Its Demise, 15 NEV. L.J. 1523, 1550-58 (2015)
(identifying various “democratic benefits” of trials in structural-reform litigation); Resnik,
Constitutional Entitlements, supra note 63, at 947 (“[T]he iterative participatory practices in
courts are one method of giving practical expression to democratic values.”).
65
See LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 113; Lahav, Roles of Litigation,
supra note 7, at 1668; Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements, supra note 63, at 992; Resnik,
Fairness in Numbers, supra note 63, at 88.
66
For various conceptions of social equality, see generally DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 232 (1999); Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109
ETHICS 287 (1999); and Samuel Scheffler, What Is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5,
21-34 (2003).
67
See LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 140 (identifying courts as venue
for “equal standing” or “status equality”); Hadfield & Ryan, supra note 44, at 70 (“In the
context of democratic citizenship . . . the symmetric and abstract obligation to account—to
provide information in the context of a legal claim filed in a public court—is an important
means by which the principle of abstract equality among citizens is made manifest.”). As have
civil recourse theorists. See, e.g., JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE
OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 397 (2010); Goldberg, supra note 44, at 607;
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 43, at 604; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 44, at 982;
Solomon, supra note 43, at 245.
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senses in both law and philosophy, 68 perhaps the most familiar one, typically
associated with Immanuel Kant, defines dignity as the intrinsic moral worth that
all human beings possess simply in virtue of being human.69 Waldron contends
that this modern, egalitarian notion of dignity actually emerged from an earlier,
hierarchical notion—specifically, the ancient Roman concept of dignitas, which
denoted the high social status enjoyed by the aristocracy. 70 During the
Enlightenment, Waldron argues, this status-based understanding of dignity “was
transvalued rather than superseded,” as the high status that had once been
reserved to the aristocracy was extended to all human beings.71 On this account,
“the modern notion of human dignity involves an upwards equalization of rank,
so that we now try to accord to every human being something of the dignity,
rank, and expectation of respect that was formerly accorded to nobility.”72
Dignity is now a kind of “nobility for the common man.” 73

68
See generally, e.g., Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 169 (2011); Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 183 (2011); Michael Rosen, Dignity: The Case Against, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN DIGNITY 143, 153-54 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013).
69
See, e.g., AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 42, 57-75 (Naomi Goldblum trans.,
1996); Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS
10, 12 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992); Herbert Speigelberg, Human
Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy, in HUMAN DIGNITY: THIS CENTURY AND
THE NEXT 39, 56 (Rubin Gotesky & Ervin Laszlo eds., 1970).
70
See JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 31-33 (Meir Dan-Cohen ed.,
2012); see also Henry, supra note 68, at 190-92. For a competing account of this history, see
MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 11-19 (2012) (acknowledging
historical connection between dignity and aristocratic status but contending that many
historical thinkers also conceptualized dignity as intrinsic property of all human beings).
71
WALDRON, supra note 70, at 31.
72
Id. at 33. Professor James Whitman has described a similar process of “leveling up”—
that is, “an extension of formerly high-status treatment to all sectors of the population.” James
Q. Whitman, Human Dignity in Europe and the United States: The Social Foundations, in
EUROPE AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 108, 110 (G. Nolte ed., 2005) [hereinafter Whitman,
Dignity]. To be sure, Whitman contends that this leveling up was primarily a Continental
European phenomenon, whereas the United States experienced a leveling down—that is, “an
extension of formerly [low-]status treatment to all sectors of the population.” Id.; see also
James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279,
1384-90 (2000) [hereinafter Whitman, Enforcing] (comparing “leveling up” and “leveling
down” conceptions of dignity); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:
Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1164-71 (2004) [hereinafter Whitman, Privacy]
(analyzing “leveling up” conception of dignity in the European tradition). But Whitman
acknowledges that this is only a relative claim and that the high-status notion of dignity
persists in certain areas of American legal practice. See Whitman, Enforcing, supra, at 1372;
Whitman, Privacy, supra, at 1162-63.
73
WALDRON, supra note 70, at 22.
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As dignity has been universally distributed, the concept has become bound up
with equality; “dignity and equality,” Waldron acknowledges, “are
interdependent.”74 But that doesn’t mean that his status-based account of dignity
is conceptually confused. Dignity can take on valences associated with other
values without reducing to them. Something like this has occurred in
constitutional law, where recent substantive due process cases have employed
the concept of dignity to characterize claims that implicate both liberty and
equality values but reduce to neither.75 Similarly, on Waldron’s status-based
account, dignity evokes the egalitarian vision of a “society of equals,” while
infusing that somewhat vague vision with more specific content. Though it has
assumed egalitarian resonances, dignity calls attention to normative
considerations that remain obscure if we focus on equality alone.
If dignity attaches to a particular (high) social status, then in a modern,
egalitarian society “legal citizenship” is the analogue of aristocracy.76 Every
ordinary citizen must now be treated with the same dignity that was once the
prerogative of members of the nobility. As with Mashaw’s account of dignity, 77
this means that the state must follow certain legal procedures before taking
actions that affect a particular individual’s interests. 78 Dignity demands due
process. But dignity also concerns how we stand in relation to one another. In
particular, Waldron contends that we enjoy dignity only insofar as we possess
certain rights and can hold others accountable for violating those rights. 79 To
possess dignity is to be a rights-bearer, and rights-bearers “stand up for
themselves; they make unapologetic claims on their own behalf; they control the
pursuit and prosecution of their own grievances.”80 It is this vision of the

74

Id. at 55.
See generally, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Kenji Yoshino, A
New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147 (2015); Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
76
WALDRON, supra note 70, at 61; see also Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship and Dignity, in
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 68, at 327, 327-32 (discussing Kant’s views on
dignity, status, and citizenship).
77
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
78
See WALDRON, supra note 70, at 54-55; Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity,
71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200, 208-10 (2012); Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the
Importance of Procedure, in NOMOS 50: GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 3, 5-7 (James E.
Fleming ed., 2011).
79
See WALDRON, supra note 70, at 49-50.
80
Id.; cf. Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA.
L. REV. 863, 897-917 (1988) (defending right of confrontation in criminal trials in similar
terms). But see Stephen Darwall, Equal Dignity and Rights, in DIGNITY: A HISTORY 181, 19098 (Remy Debes ed., 2017) (arguing that Waldron’s status-based conception of dignity cannot
ground this “second-personal” authority to make claims against others and hold them
accountable).
75
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assertive rights-bearer that access-to-justice scholars conjure in extolling the
power to call others to account.
Our legal system institutionalizes that power through civil litigation. Indeed,
Waldron himself associates possessing dignity with being able to initiate and
prosecute a lawsuit: among law’s many dignity-respecting features, he argues,
is the fact that it “will recognize potential plaintiffs and defer to their dignity in
allowing them to make the decision whether some norm-violator is to be taken
to task or not.”81 In empowering each of us to hale others into court and call
them to account by demanding answers from them, civil litigation accords us
something of the high status that was once the exclusive province of the
aristocracy. This is why the accountability-based defense of civil litigation
recently espoused by some access-to-justice scholars is best conceptualized as a
dignitarian turn.
Understood in status-based terms, dignity is at least in part an expressive
value,82 and the accountability benefits that access-to-justice scholars ascribe to
civil litigation are likewise partly expressive. Expressivism is the idea that acts
can convey social meanings in addition to having material effects.83 So to say
that a particular value, such as dignity, is an expressive value is to say that
whether a given act accords with or contravenes that value depends on the act’s
social meaning. On a status-based account, dignity requires us to perform acts
that express the kind of respect befitting the high status we all now enjoy84 (and,
conversely, to eschew acts that explicitly or implicitly deny that status, which
would perpetrate an “expressive harm”).85
Civil litigation accords plaintiffs such respect by giving them opportunities to
demand answers from those who have wronged them. The rules require
defendants to offer some kind of response to those demands, and to thereby
81

WALDRON, supra note 70, at 51.
Cf. Tarunabh Khaitan, Dignity as an Expressive Norm: Neither Vacuous nor a Panacea,
32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (2012) (arguing that dignity cannot aid legal analysis unless
it’s understood as an expressive value).
83
On the ability of laws to convey social meanings, see generally Elizabeth S. Anderson
& Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1503 (2000); and Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996). For a critique, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1462-93 (2000).
84
See Michael Rosen, Dignity Past and Present, in DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS, supra
note 70, at 79, 96 (“[T]o treat someone with dignity is to treat them in a way that expressively
attributes to them the highest status.”). In particular, dignity demands a form of what Stephen
Darwall has called “recognition respect.” See Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88
ETHICS 36, 38-39 (1977) (distinguishing between respect for people as human beings—
“recognition respect”—and respect accorded people on account of their accomplishments).
85
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 83, at 1527; see also Rosen, supra note 84, at 95 (“What
degradation, insult, and contempt have in common is that they are expressive or symbolic
harms, ones in which the elevated status of human beings fails to be acknowledged.”).
82
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tacitly acknowledge plaintiffs’ equal (high) status—their dignity. 86 And because
defendants must respond in a public forum, plaintiffs’ dignity is recognized and
reaffirmed by the political community as well. Civil litigation provides that
recognition whether or not the defendant is ultimately found liable. The
dignitarian benefits of civil litigation can thus be substantially realized through
procedures short of full-blown adjudication.
B.

Dignity’s Domain

I’ve argued that, in defending civil litigation as a forum in which we can hold
one another accountable, several access-to-justice scholars can be understood as
implicitly relying on a particular status-based conception of dignity. But how
broadly does this dignitarian defense of civil litigation sweep? Within civil
litigation, what is dignity’s domain?
The scope of the dignitarian turn can be delineated along at least two
dimensions. The first is the nature of the substantive legal claims involved in a
lawsuit. One might initially think that dignity is as much a matter of substance
as procedure, and that civil litigation can therefore realize dignity only in cases
involving claims that allege some specifically dignitarian harm, such as
defamation or sexual assault.87 Civil litigation may indeed have the strongest
dignitarian effects in such cases, as plaintiffs’ demands for answers would seem
to pack the biggest expressive punch when a defendant has not only wronged
but also insulted them. But it doesn’t follow that civil litigation enables plaintiffs
to reassert their dignity only when they’re avenging some kind of personal
affront. On the contrary, because having dignity means having the standing to
possess and vindicate rights, plaintiffs can reassert their dignity in civil litigation
whenever it’s reasonable to view them as entitled to an explanation from the
defendant. And that will be so as long as they reasonably believe they’ve been
mistreated in some way, which will be the case whenever they reasonably
believe they’ve suffered some legal wrong.88 When an employee believes her
employer discriminated against her, or when a consumer believes a
manufacturer’s defective product harmed her, or even when one business partner
believes another breached their contract, the plaintiff has an interest in eliciting

86
Cf. Solomon, supra note 43, at 257 (“[I]n exercising the right to recourse . . . the one
empowered is able to remind the wrongdoer that she is worth respect and attention, and thus
her status is that of an equal.”).
87
Cf., e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, Essay, Understanding Freedman’s Ethics, 33 ARIZ. L.
REV. 455, 465 (1991) (“Individual dignity is not directly at issue in most civil litigation.”).
88
See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 44, at 930-31, 943, 947-53 (identifying legal
wronging as form of “mistreatment”); Anthony J. Sebok, What Is Wrong About Wrongdoing?,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 224 (2011) (developing similar account). This might be true even
of a breach of contract. See Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 1, 13-15 (2009); Oman, Consent, supra note 43, at 544-51. But see Curtis Bridgeman,
Civil Recourse or Civil Powers?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (arguing that contract law
isn’t concerned with wrongs).
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an explanation from the defendant for her perceived injury, and civil litigation
provides her with a powerful way of vindicating that interest. Every legal claim,
regardless of its particular content, potentially implicates the plaintiff’s dignity,
even if civil litigation’s dignitarian valence is stronger for some kinds of claims
than for others.
A second dimension for determining the scope of the dignitarian turn is the
identity of the parties to a lawsuit. Proponents of the dignitarian turn focus on
the dignitarian benefits of civil litigation for individual, natural-person plaintiffs.
This focus accords with Waldron’s status-based conception of dignity, for
whether or not corporations and other artificial persons can have rights, they
certainly don’t enjoy the same high social standing as individual citizens. So
whatever the reasons for allowing artificial persons to sue may be, respecting
dignity isn’t among them. The defendant, by contrast, can be either a natural or
an artificial person. So long as defendants can respond to plaintiffs’ demands for
an explanation (even if only through a lawyer or other human agent), plaintiffs
can reassert their dignity by suing them.
Much contemporary civil litigation thus provides a sufficiently hospitable
expressive environment for access-to-justice theory to take a dignitarian turn.89
II.

THE INDIGNITIES OF ACCESSING JUSTICE

The dignitarian turn in access-to-justice scholarship offers what strikes me as
an attractive normative vision of the role civil litigation can play in our society.
There’s something appealing in the notion that we all equally enjoy the standing
to call one another to account by demanding explanations for perceived legal
wrongs. To be sure, the dignitarian turn’s defense of civil litigation is in large
measure aspirational. Our civil justice system falls short of the ideal of mutual
accountability in many respects, erecting numerous hurdles, both formal and
practical, along the path to demanding explanations from others. Formally, the

89
Other facets of contemporary civil practice, by contrast, seem less amenable to the kind
of accountability-based defense offered by the dignitarian turn. For example, many mass
settlements that occur in the shadow—but outside the formal mechanisms—of civil litigation
don’t even purport to provide victims with answers, but instead attempt only to compensate
them for their injuries, often according to highly regimented rubrics. See, e.g., Nora Freeman
Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1529-30 (2009) (finding
that “settlement mills” use formulaic settlement rates rather than evaluating legitimacy of each
client’s claims); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
805, 838-39 (2011) (finding that “settlement mills” incentivize employees to reach
settlements quickly and to avoid filing suit); Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The
Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1618-31 (2004) (attributing decline in civil trials to increase in aggregate
settlements); Christopher J. Robinette, Two Roads Diverge for Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND.
L.J. 543, 552-64 (2013) (examining standardization of settlement of auto-accident claims).

526

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:501

law immunizes certain categories of defendants from suit altogether90 and bars
certain categories of plaintiffs from seeking any redress.91 As a practical matter,
many plaintiffs lack the resources necessary to make full use of the procedures
for demanding answers from defendants, much less to retain a lawyer to help
them to navigate those procedures.92 And yet, notwithstanding all of these
impediments, it remains the case that civil litigation substantially honors our
standing as equals—indeed, at least as much as any of our other political
institutions.
The dignitarian turn, moreover, appears, if anything, to bolster the standard
access-to-justice case against greater secrecy in civil litigation. Although accessto-justice scholars oppose secrecy primarily on various consequentialist
grounds,93 a status-based conception of dignity would seem to demand greater
publicity, too. One can, I suppose, demand answers from others even in
private—so long as they’re obligated to respond. But because dignity, according
to a status-based conception, is partly an expressive value,94 and thus requires
others to demonstrate proper respect for one’s high status, it is most fully
realized through institutions that publicly recognize one’s standing to call others
to account.95 Asserting one’s dignity by holding others accountable is a kind of
performance, and like any performance, it can succeed completely only when it
has an appropriate audience.

90
Indeed, in the case of sovereign immunity, the concept of dignity may have actually
contributed to this lack of accountability. See Don Herzog, Aristocratic Dignity?, in DIGNITY,
RANK, AND RIGHTS, supra note 70, at 99, 101, 104-06 (arguing that aristocratic notion of
dignity originally meant unanswerability—that is, not having to give answers in court—and
that this idea persists in modern doctrine of sovereign immunity); Judith Resnik & Julie Chihye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1922-27 (2003) (criticizing Supreme Court’s invocation
of concept of dignity to justify state sovereign immunity).
91
E.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2018) (barring prisoners who
have had three or more lawsuits dismissed as “frivolous” from bringing additional lawsuits).
92
See generally BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (Samuel
Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016) (compiling statistics on “civil justice gap” and proposing
reforms).
93
See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
94
See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
95
Cf. THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY 47-72 (2008) (arguing that
one must be publicly treated as an equal in order to be fully treated as an equal); R.A. DUFF,
TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 115 (1991) (arguing that criminal punishment can communicate
condemnation of offender’s conduct only if it’s public); Gerald J. Postema, Fidelity,
Accountability and Trust: Tensions at the Heart of the Rule of Law 12, 23-24 (Mar. 1, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126397
[https://perma.cc/RX3G-UQVF] (arguing that practices of mutual accountability generally
must be public).
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Were that all there was to dignity, the case against secrecy in civil litigation
would be fairly straightforward. But any dignitarian account of civil procedure
will prove to be much more complicated than the dignitarian turn implies. For
like many other values, dignity is a multifaceted concept, and when it comes to
the desirability of secrecy in civil litigation, there’s another facet of dignity that
cuts the other way than the status-based conception of dignity (hereinafter
referred to as “dignity-as-status”). As Section II.A shows, nonhumiliation—
understood as the ability to control one’s self-presentation or public image—is
also an aspect of dignity. Section II.B then contends that civil litigation can
subject plaintiffs to a significant amount of humiliation in that sense, requiring
them to divulge a wealth of sensitive personal information that undermines their
preferred public image. Finally, Section II.C shows how civil litigation’s
capacity to humiliate complicates access-to-justice scholars’ categorical
opposition to secrecy in civil procedure, with the potential to also unsettle
standard access-to-justice positions on other prominent procedural issues that
initially seem to have little to do with dignity.
A.

Dignity and Humiliation

Humiliation is commonly presented as the antithesis of dignity. 96 To be
humiliated in this sense typically means to have one’s dignity directly
assaulted—where dignity refers to the inherent moral worth that all human
beings possess simply in virtue of being human97 and humiliation to the denial
of one’s humanity.98 It is the humiliation perpetrated by such moral outrages as
torture.99
I want to argue that civil litigation implicates a different notion of humiliation,
which corresponds to a different notion of dignity. Especially in Continental
European legal and moral thought, dignity can also refer to one’s control over
one’s public image or self-presentation—the way one appears to other members
of society.100 This understanding of dignity (hereinafter referred to as “dignity96

See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements, in HUMAN
DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS
351, 378 (2008) (identifying “self-respect and non-humiliation” as “necessary conditions of a
life worthy of human dignity”).
97
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
98
See MARGALIT, supra note 69, at 122-26 (portraying humiliation as injury to one’s selfrespect, understood as one’s sense of oneself as a member of humanity); M ARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 204 (2004)
(“Humiliation typically makes the statement that the person in question is low, not on a par
with others in terms of human dignity.”).
99
Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued that racial discrimination similarly humiliates its
victims, in the sense of violating their dignity. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 137-41 (2014).
100
See Whitman, Dignity, supra note 72, at 121 (“[T]he European right of privacy is, at its
base, a right to the control over one’s image . . . .”); see also Michael J. Meyer, Dignity,
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as-image”) obviously overlaps with privacy, which on one of its many meanings
refers to “the interest in having a reasonable measure of control over ways in
which we present ourselves to others and the ability to present different aspects
of ourselves, and what is ours, to different people.”101 To enjoy privacy in this
sense is to be able to decide whether to reveal our personal information in
different contexts, and to thereby construct different public images for different
audiences.102 It is in this sense that privacy constitutes another aspect of
dignity.103
“Humiliation” can also refer to the violation of the privacy aspect of one’s
dignity, one’s dignity-as-image. On one prominent account, humiliation
involves “the deflation of pretension”104—in particular, “the pretension of
vanity,” a “consciously intended style of self-presentation.”105 You are therefore
humiliated when your self-presentation is exposed as false, as mere
Rights, and Self-Control, 99 ETHICS 520, 529-34 (1989) (“[T]he capacity to exercise selfcontrol is necessary if one is to be said to have dignity.”). The notion of a person’s selfpresentation comes from ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 2
(1959).
101
Andrei Marmour, What Is the Right to Privacy?, 43 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 7 (2015). See
generally ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 5-63 (1967) (developing conception of
privacy as ability to control one’s public image). To be sure, while such control is necessary
for privacy, it is not sufficient. To be able to truly control our personal information, we must
inhabit a social environment that offers “meaningful choices” between states of privacy and
publicity. See Lisa M. Austin, Re-reading Westin, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53, 68-77
(2019).
102
It strikes me that this formulation of the privacy aspect of dignity remains agnostic on
the metaphysical question whether the self is autonomously or socially constructed; the ability
to shape one’s public image remains important either way. Contra Julie E. Cohen, What
Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906-11 (2013) (arguing that understanding privacy
as control over one’s personal information presumes (erroneous) conception of the self as
autonomously constructed).
103
See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1002-03 (1964) (identifying invasion of privacy as
“dignitary tort”). I see less of a sharp distinction between this dignitarian notion of privacy
and “data privacy”—practices that regulate the processing of personal information—than
does Professor Robert Post. See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google
Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J.
981, 983-95 (2018) (distinguishing data privacy rights that limit governmental use of data
from dignitarian privacy rights that “enforce social norms of respectful expression”). It seems
that, in our digital world, a degree of digital privacy is an essential means of preserving one’s
dignity-as-image.
104
WILLIAM IAN MILLER, HUMILIATION: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL
DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE 137 (1993) [hereinafter MILLER, HUMILIATION].
105
Id. at 142. Humiliation can also refer to the attendant “emotion we feel when our
pretensions are discovered,” though one need not experience this emotion in order to be
humiliated. Id. at 10.
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“pretension.” And the most straightforward way for that to occur is through the
revelation of personal information that is inconsistent with your selfpresentation. By allowing people to prevent such public exposure, privacy can
enable them to avoid humiliation and thus to preserve their dignity. 106
This use of the term “humiliation” might seem to imply that the interest in
avoiding public exposure of one’s personal information reduces to an interest in
hiding aspects of one’s identity of which one is ashamed or embarrassed. This
Article, however, uses “humiliation” in a broader sense. True, people sometimes
seek to keep information private because they scorn the aspects of their identity
to which it pertains. But even when they embrace those characteristics, they still
might desire secrecy in order to more easily conform to prevailing social norms
and to thereby avoid any social stigma or other, more practical adverse
consequences attaching to the traits.107 It nevertheless makes sense to describe
the revelation of their personal information as “humiliating” so long as they’re
being compelled to disclose aspects of their identity that, for whatever reason,
they don’t want others to see. Although it may be more intensely humiliating to
have your most embarrassing traits publicly revealed, it’s still always at least
somewhat humiliating to be exposed as something other than what you had
purported to be.
One might question whether the notion of humiliation as the violation of
dignity-as-image still has much purchase in our society. After all, humiliation,
understood as the “deflation of pretension,” presupposes a social group whose
members are concerned about commanding one another’s respect and,
conversely, not losing face in front of one another—in short, an “honor
group.”108 And yet, the objection runs, we no longer inhabit a strong honor

106
See Lisa M. Austin, Privacy, Shame, and the Anxieties of Identity 11-12 (Jan. 1, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2061748
[https://perma.cc/ZKX5-HB9S] (“[P]rivacy protects important conditions of selfpresentation, or our ability to be seen by others in the way that we want to be seen.”); see also
James David Velleman, The Genesis of Shame, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 27, 42-43 (2001) (“Once
we acquire the idea of privacy . . . we can think about excluding other, non-motivational facts
from our self-presentation.”). Although Professors Lisa Austin and James Velleman use the
term “shame,” I’ll follow Professor William Miller in using the term “humiliation” in order
to preserve the distinction between (1) the reaction one has when one’s self-presentation is
exposed as false (humiliation) and (2) the reaction one has when one is caught violating
serious social norms associated with public morality (shame). See MILLER, HUMILIATION,
supra note 104, at 10; infra Part III (analyzing Miller’s account of shame).
107
See, e.g., Alison Frankel, In New Fraud Class Action v. Trump Organization, Plaintiffs
Lobby Hard for Anonymity, REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2018, 6:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/legal-us-otc-pseudo/in-new-fraud-class-action-v-trump-organization-plaintiffslobby-hard-for-anonymity-idUSKCN1N42W0 [https://perma.cc/6HHC-LAZD] (describing
lawsuit in which plaintiffs sought to sue pseudonymously in order to avoid “harassment and
retaliation”).
108
MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 104, at 116.
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culture;109 today we think you should be able to command the respect of others
regardless of their personal impressions of you, simply in virtue of your
humanity. One might thus see my invocation of humiliation and dignity-asimage as anachronistic, a throwback to premodern honor societies and their
violent cycles of revenge. Indeed, dignity-as-image might seem inconsistent
with dignity-as-status, insofar as the latter insists that we all occupy the same
high status and thus are entitled to the same respect.110
There may well be good reasons to seek to minimize the role that notions of
honor, humiliation, and dignity-as-image play in our society. But however
laudable that aspiration might be, as a purely descriptive matter, we haven’t put
such notions completely behind us.111 Notwithstanding our collective
commitment to respecting everyone as an equal, most people still very much
care about how they appear to others, and thus how much of their personal
information is made public.112 And as long as that’s the case, the privacy aspect
of dignity will remain an important value. This suggests that a concern with
avoiding humiliation and preserving dignity-as-image can actually coexist with
a commitment to dignity-as-status: even as we recognize one another as moral
equals, we’ll inevitably keep sizing one another up and striving to be seen as
we’d like to be seen, even if not as we really are, and will therefore continue to
value the privacy aspect of our dignity. 113
109
See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 702-26 (1986) (arguing that contemporary Americans
are less concerned with their reputations for the sake of their “honor” and more concerned
about the effects of their reputations on their ability to acquire property).
110
Cf. Darwall & Darwall, supra note 45, at 20, 30-37 (criticizing honor for engendering
disrespect, revenge, and retaliation and contrasting it with moral respect involved in mutual
accountability).
111
See MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 104, at 9 (“Honor is not our official ideology,
but its ethic survives in pockets of most all our lives.”). See generally KWAME ANTHONY
APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW MORAL REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN (2010) (defending centrality
of honor to moral theory).
112
See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 15 (1989) (arguing that regard of others
is integral to “our sense of ourselves as commanding (attitudinal) respect”); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25 (1st paperback ed. 1990) (“Most of us tend to care what others
(at least some others, some significant group whose good opinion we value) think about
us . . . . Our self-respect is social in at least this sense, and it is simply part of the human
condition that we are weak and vulnerable in these ways.”). Individuals’ privacy concerns
persist even in an age of digital “exposure”: even as people willingly share some of their most
intimate information online, they sense that it’s being disseminated even more broadly than
they wish. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 2-3 (2015).
113
See also infra Section III.A.3 and accompanying text (discussing compatibility of social
hierarchy and legal equality). By contrast, Professor Scott Hershovitz contends that what I’m
calling dignity-as-status has largely superseded notions of honor. See Hershovitz, Wrongs,
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While granting that a concern with dignity-as-image is in principle compatible
with a commitment to dignity-as-status, one might nevertheless deny that the
two are equally important. One might, in particular, acknowledge the continued
significance of dignity-as-image but strictly prioritize maintaining dignity-asstatus in any conflict between the two. This view is not without force, and I can’t
fully address it here, but I do think that it faces at least two significant
difficulties.
First, the two aspects of dignity were inextricably linked historically. Recall
that, according to Waldron, dignity originally denoted the high status of the
nobility, a status that was subsequently extended to all human beings. 114 Privacy,
understood as an interest in controlling one’s self-presentation and thus avoiding
humiliation, appears to have been one important privilege associated with that
high status.115 As in ancient Rome, the two may continue to go hand-in-hand.
Second, dignity-as-image seems to be an essential precondition for garnering
proper respect for one’s dignity-as-status. As Waldron observes, dignity-asstatus has “resonances of something like noble bearing.”116 It connotes “having
a certain sort of presence; uprightness of bearing; self-possession and selfcontrol; self-presentation as someone to be reckoned with; not being abject,
pitiable, distressed, or overly submissive in circumstances of adversity.” 117 One
seems to require a significant amount of control over the dissemination of one’s
personal information in order to construct and maintain the kind of public image
befitting a person of high status.
Just as dignity-as-status and dignity-as-image are intertwined as a conceptual
matter, so, too, are they linked as a practical matter, through the notion of

supra note 37, at 12-14. I think things are a bit more complicated. Rather than “car[ing] more
about dignity than honor,” id. at 16, I think most people care about both in roughly equal
measure. Yet we generally fail to appreciate the extent to which these two concerns can come
into conflict. One could attempt to reconcile dignity-as-status and dignity-as-image by
defining a polity’s citizenry as the relevant “honor group.” See Oman, Honor, supra note 43,
at 53-55 (conceptualizing dignity-as-status as form of “horizontal” honor established among
peers). The problem with this strategy is that, in seeking to reconcile the two notions of
dignity, it risks conflating them.
114
See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
115
See Whitman, Privacy, supra note 72, at 1169 (“[T]he conception of privacy as control
over one’s public image is a conception originally and primarily concerned with the doings
of very high-status persons.”).
116
WALDRON, supra note 70, at 21.
117
Id. at 22; see also TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 15-16 (“Our ‘dignity’ . . . is our sense of
ourselves as commanding (attitudinal) respect.”); Henry, supra note 68, at 215 (arguing that
dignity requires degree of both “internal and external respect”); Rosen, supra note 70, at 96;
Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Old Age 18-19 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 17-41, 2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048041 [https://perma.cc/3WV8-M5Y6] (identifying as one aspect
of dignity having an “honorable self-image”).
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publicity. As explained earlier, dignity-as-status presupposes a degree of
publicity; as an expressive value, it depends on public recognition of, and
appropriate respect for, one’s high status.118 Yet publicity also risks humiliation,
for upon entering the public square, one opens oneself up to the potential
revelation of personal information that undercuts one’s preferred public
image.119 While it’s of course true that one constructs one’s self-presentation for
public consumption, dignity-as-image requires that one be able to keep certain
personal information private from certain audiences, which is hardly a guarantee
in the kinds of public fora in which one vindicates one’s dignity-as-status. 120 The
same conditions that are necessary for the recognition of our dignity-as-status
thus make it more difficult to maintain our dignity-as-image.
B.

Humiliation in Civil Litigation

This last, pragmatic connection between dignity-as-image and dignity-asstatus sets the stage for a particularly acute conflict between the two in the
context of civil litigation. Even as civil litigation affords plaintiffs numerous
opportunities to assert their dignity-as-status by publicly demanding answers
from defendants, it can also repeatedly compromise their dignity-as-image by
compelling them to reveal personal information that is potentially inconsistent
with their self-presentation.121 A complete dignitarian account of civil procedure

118
See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text; see also Katherine Franke, Response,
Dignifying Rights: A Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities,
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1177, 1182 (2011) (arguing that dignity “is an intersubjective enterprise,” in
that “dignity is no dignity at all if it is not respected by others”); cf. Hadfield & Ryan, supra
note 44, at 87 (“Only in a public forum can one not only see oneself, but also be seen by
others, as a person to whom even the powerful must respond.”).
119
See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
120
See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
121
I want to enter a methodological caveat before proceeding further. Although my
approach in this Article is primarily theoretical and normative, my argument—particularly in
this Section—involves numerous empirical premises regarding plaintiffs’ subjective
understandings of the litigation process and motivations for engaging in it. There’s an
extensive social-science literature establishing the fact that many individuals with viable legal
claims fail to escalate those claims up the “dispute pyramid” to the more formal stages of
dispute resolution. For foundational contributions to that literature, see generally William L.F.
Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980); and Marc Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). And yet,
we unfortunately know very little about how often individuals choose to “lump” their legally
cognizable injuries rather than sue, much less why they forbear. See Theodore Eisenberg, The
Need for a National Civil Justice Survey of Incidence and Claiming Behavior, in BEYOND
ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, supra note 92, at 53. While I cite the
available empirical research where relevant, it tends to be only suggestive and impressionistic.
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must go beyond the rosy picture painted by the dignitarian turn and take stock
of the indignities of civil litigation.122
Notwithstanding the dearth of scholarship on the dignitarian costs of
prosecuting a lawsuit,123 we all intuitively appreciate that civil litigation can be
profoundly humiliating for plaintiffs. Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom has
given particularly eloquent expression to this reality with respect to the
prosecution of tort suits:
[T]he process of claim initiation and litigation—with its probing, and
sometimes humiliating, discovery into the most private facets of one’s life;
its prolonged uncertainty; and its insistent demand that a claimant relive,
repeatedly, publicly, and under oath, what she saw, thought, heard, and felt,
on what may have been the most searing day of her life—is brutal. The act
of claiming, for some, may be cathartic and empowering. But for at least
some others, it stands to be positively dreadful—effectively inflicting a
second serious injury.124
Engstrom identifies two different ways in which civil litigation can be
humiliating for plaintiffs, and it’s worth pausing to distinguish them. First,
plaintiffs must publicly proclaim themselves to have suffered a legal wrong—to

And insofar as they rest on empirical presuppositions, my theoretical and normative
conclusions must be as well.
122
Although my focus remains on individual plaintiffs, scholars have noted reasons for
business-entity plaintiffs to avoid the publicity associated with prosecuting a lawsuit,
especially the potential revelation of trade secrets. See generally, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar &
Lisa Bernstein, Essay, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000). On
the other hand, business-entity plaintiffs sometimes pursue litigation precisely because of its
publicity, as a way of enhancing their reputations. See generally Kishanthi Parella, Public
Relations Litigation, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1285 (2019).
123
There is an extensive literature on the myriad psychological costs of prosecuting certain
kinds of lawsuits. For a recent overview, see generally Michaela Keet, Heather Heavin &
Shawna Sparrow, Anticipating and Managing the Psychological Cost of Civil Litigation, 34
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST., no. 2, 2017, at 73. Civil procedure scholars, however, have
paid much less attention to the theoretical implications of these costs.
124
Nora Freeman Engstrom, ISO the Missing Plaintiff, JOTWELL (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://torts.jotwell.com/iso-the-missing-plaintiff [https://perma.cc/HZ83-3WR4]; see also
Herstein, supra note 43, at 102 (“For many tort victims, the path that the law of tort charts for
obtaining a remedy is long, discouraging, expensive, confusing, daunting, and emotionally
and financially taxing. . . . [A]t times, private litigation may do more to debilitate, cripple, and
deplete the energies and resources of victims than it does to empower them.”). For an
especially candid acknowledgement by a federal judge of the many drawbacks of civil
litigation for plaintiffs, see Benjamin Weiser, Judge in 9/11 Suits Feels No Regret that None
Ever Went to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2016, at A15 (interviewing U.S. District Judge Alvin
K. Hellerstein, who has “long believed that courts [are] not the best venue for civil litigants
to seek answers”).
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be victims125—and then repeatedly recount the details of their victimization in
public filings, in deposition testimony, and (in rare cases) in open court.126
Depending on the nature of their legal claims, plaintiffs may find the experience
of having to publicly describe their legal injuries over and over again to be
humiliating.127 Second, defendants can use discovery to probe deep into
plaintiffs’ lives, with much of the uncovered information eventually becoming
part of the public record.128 Notwithstanding the differences between these two
modes of humiliation in civil litigation, however, each involves the revelation of
plaintiffs’ personal information—whether facts about their victimization or
details about other parts of their lives—that potentially conflicts with their
preferred self-presentation.129 Each thus threatens to compromise plaintiffs’
dignity-as-image.
The specific procedures by which plaintiffs can be humiliated during civil
litigation are familiar. But what’s particularly noteworthy in light of the
dignitarian turn is that they are the very same procedures that enable plaintiffs
to demand answers from defendants—to call them to account. From a dignitarian
perspective, each procedure of civil litigation proves to be a double-edged sword
for plaintiffs, empowering them to assert their dignity-as-status while
threatening to compromise their dignity-as-image. 130
This duality is present from the very first filing in any lawsuit, and indeed
from the top of its very first page. To initiate a lawsuit and make an initial
demand for an explanation from a defendant, plaintiffs must file a complaint
with the court.131 Like any other pleading, the complaint must include a caption
125

See Resnik, Access, supra note 11, at 645 (“Taking steps to identify oneself as
harmed . . . [is] requisite to seeking redress . . . .”).
126
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that the “victim” label implicit in filing a
lawsuit deters certain individuals from asserting their legal rights through civil litigation. See,
e.g., Kristin Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Legal
Protection, 12 SIGNS 421, 433-35 (1987) (describing reluctance of victims of discrimination
to see themselves, and be seen by others, as such).
127
See RIPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 15 (“Perhaps you are too embarrassed to come forward
with your grievance—you don’t want to admit you were there, or that you fell for that . . . .”).
128
See infra notes 134-35.
129
In both of these ways, civil litigation forces plaintiffs into a form of what Professor
Jonathan Wolff has called “shameful revelation,” which occurs when “people are required,
for whatever reason, to do things, or reveal things about themselves, that they find shameful”
(or, in this Article’s terminology, humiliating). Jonathan Wolff, Fairness, Respect, and the
Egalitarian Ethos, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 97, 109 (1998); see id. at 113-14 (showing how
claimants of public welfare benefits must engage in shameful revelation).
130
Cf. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 25-34 (1979) (arguing that due process protections can protract
adjudication processes that criminal defendants charged with misdemeanors and low-level
felonies fear even more than formal punishment).
131
FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
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naming all of the parties, including the plaintiff.132 So plaintiffs must begin their
lawsuits by putting their names to the left of the “v,” publicly proclaiming
themselves to have been the victims of a legal wrong. In the body of the
complaint, they must recount the facts of their victimization in sufficient detail
to satisfy the general pleading standard.133 The entire complaint, from caption to
prayer for relief, must be filed with the court and entered on its docket, thereby
becoming part of the public record.134 Some of a plaintiff’s personal information
will be automatically redacted from the publicly available version of the
complaint, though generally only information that could facilitate identity theft,
such as birthdates and social security numbers; 135 plaintiffs typically can’t
expurgate other kinds of sensitive information, such as embarrassing details of
their injuries. And while members of the public once had to scour physical court
records in order to uncover the details of a lawsuit, many courts now post
complaints on their public websites for all to see.136 Simply by filing a
complaint, then, plaintiffs expose themselves to a significant amount of public
scrutiny. Assuming that many plaintiffs don’t wish to be seen as victims or to
have all the facts underlying their legal claims revealed to perfect strangers, such
scrutiny will inevitably undermine their preferred public image.
If their complaint withstands the defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiffs will
then be able to use the tools of discovery to uncover information about the
defendant—but only to have the defendant use those same tools to uncover
information about them. And the discovery process can be very intrusive indeed.
As a prominent federal judge once observed, the federal discovery rules confer

132

FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a).
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
134
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d), 79(a).
135
FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2.
136
See David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of
Practical Obscurity, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1397 [hereinafter Ardia, Privacy] (noting that
federal and many state courts provide online access to public that provides “party names, case
type, keywords, and other information and typically also provides case-by-case browsing”);
Karen Eltis, The Judicial System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship Between
Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber Context, 56 MCGILL L.J. 289, 311-15 (2011)
(highlighting issues of technology and privacy in judicial system); Lynn M. LoPucki, CourtSystem Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 484-86 (2009) (considering implications of
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) for public access to court system);
Jodi Kantor, Lawsuits’ Lurid Details Draw an Online Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2015, at
A1 (“Lawsuit papers are generally public, but before the advent of electronic filing, most of
them remained stuffed inside folders and filing cabinets at courthouses.”). See generally
Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
1 (2013) (advocating some mandated obscurity in public court filings to protect litigant
privacy); Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559 (1998) (arguing “that privacy in public . . . is a genuine
privacy interest that is worthy of study as well as protection”).
133
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on litigants “the power for the most massive invasion into private papers and
private information.”137 Just how “massive” that “invasion” of privacy will be is
largely in the hands of the parties themselves: within very wide limits, the parties
get to decide which documents to demand from each other,138 as well as which
questions to ask each other in depositions139 and written interrogatories.140 All
of these tools for eliciting information are governed by a capacious “relevant”
and “proportional” standard,141 with the result that the parties can end up being
compelled to disclose information well beyond what can ultimately be admitted
as evidence at trial.142 Even as plaintiffs can use this broad discovery to force
defendants to provide explanations for their injuries, so, too, can defendants use
it to uncover sensitive details of plaintiffs’ personal lives.143 Plaintiffs can seek
a protective order to either withhold a particular piece of information or at least
limit the number of people who can view it,144 but judges enjoy broad discretion
in deciding whether to grant protective orders, and many plaintiffs will end up
having to reveal at least some information they’d rather not share. Plaintiffs will
thus find it difficult to preserve their dignity-as-image during the discovery
process—to maintain unscathed the public image they had constructed before
filing their lawsuit.
Finally, plaintiffs can make public much of the information they manage to
extract during discovery from defendants. The corollary to this, of course, is that
defendants can likewise make public much of the information they manage to
extract from plaintiffs. Some courts hold that all information exchanged during
discovery is presumptively available to the public, though that position is
controversial.145 At the very least, when parties move for summary judgment,
137

Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 15 JUDGES J. 43, 49
(1976); cf. KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW 40-42 (2003)
(contrasting expansive discovery permitted by American civil procedure with privacy
concerns that limit discovery in Continental European legal systems); Whitman, Privacy,
supra note 72, at 1157 & n.27 (drawing similar contrast).
138
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), 34.
139
See FED. R. CIV. P. 30-31.
140
See FED. R. CIV. P. 33.
141
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
142
Id. (“Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to
be discoverable.”).
143
And with a court order, they can go even further, obtaining physical and mental
examinations of the plaintiff. FED. R. CIV. P. 35.
144
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”); see
also infra Section II.C.1 (analyzing various privacy-protecting devices in civil litigation,
including protective orders).
145
Compare Marcus, Modest Proposal, supra note 9, at 331 (criticizing courts that take
this position), with Resnik, Access, supra note 11, at 631 (lamenting that “[d]iscovery
materials are no longer routinely filed in courts unless appended to motions”).
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they must cite the relevant discovery materials in support of their motion,146 and
any discovery that is so “used in the proceeding” must be filed with the court. 147
If the case proceeds to trial, deposition testimony can sometimes be introduced
as evidence, consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence,148 and the trial
proceedings themselves are generally on the record and open to the public.149 In
proceeding with their lawsuits beyond the discovery stage, plaintiffs gain a
forum in which to publicize the answers defendants have already given and
potentially to elicit additional ones in open court. But they thereby cede to
defendants a significant amount of control over how much of their personal
information becomes public, and thus over the content of their self-presentation.
One might deny that any of the foregoing aspects of civil litigation can
actually compromise plaintiffs’ dignity-as-image. The objection runs as follows:
On the account given in the previous Section, one enjoys dignity-as-image
insofar as one has enough control over one’s personal information to be able to
shape one’s self-presentation. Although plaintiffs may not be able to control how
much of their personal information is exposed during civil litigation, they
deliberately choose to file and proceed with a lawsuit and thus willingly
relinquish that control. Put another way, plaintiffs exercise a kind of secondorder control over their personal information during civil litigation, deciding not
whether any specific piece of information will be shared with the defendant or
made public, but whether they’ll accept civil procedure’s liberal terms for the
exchange of information during a lawsuit. Because plaintiffs, unlike defendants,
accede to the public scrutiny that attends the prosecution of a lawsuit, they can’t
be said to suffer any injury to their dignity-as-image when they’re required to
turn over and make public personal information they’d rather not share.
This objection ultimately rests on an empirical premise regarding plaintiffs’
subjective understandings of the civil litigation process. Only if plaintiffs fully
appreciate the extent to which they’ll be subject to scrutiny during civil litigation
can they really be said to have chosen to relinquish control over their personal
information by filing suit, and thus to have maintained their dignity-as-image
notwithstanding any subsequent intrusions into their privacy. 150 At least some
plaintiffs appear to make that deliberate calculus—or so we can infer from

146

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(1).
148
FED. R. CIV. P. 32.
149
FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (requiring witness testimony to be taken in “open court” except in
limited circumstances); see infra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
right of public access to criminal and civil trials).
150
Cf. Benedict Rumbold & James Wilson, Privacy Rights and Public Information, 27 J.
POL. PHIL. 3, 6 (2019) (arguing that individuals cannot waive their right to privacy
unintentionally and that personal information can therefore remain protected by that right
even after it becomes public).
147
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anecdotal evidence that many victims of rights violations generally, 151 and of
dignitarian harms particularly,152 forgo litigation precisely because they’re
acutely aware of the scrutiny they’ll receive if they sue. 153 Given such “underclaiming,” it seems likely that some of the victims who do decide to sue grasp
litigation’s dignitarian downsides.154 We might also expect lawyers, in
discharging their ethical duty of communication,155 to apprise their clients of the
various risks associated with litigation, including the dignitarian risks. 156
And yet, while the question merits empirical study, it seems unlikely that most
plaintiffs know exactly what they’re getting into when they file a lawsuit. 157 Few
probably realize that their complaint, with all of its factual allegations, will be
made available to the public on the court’s docket and perhaps even its website.
Even fewer probably appreciate the full breadth of the federal discovery rules,
with their potential to license investigation into matters that have little to do with
the case at hand.158 In this respect, civil litigation likely resembles other contexts
commonly thought to raise privacy concerns. Consumers “choose,” for example,
to buy products from websites, but few grasp the extent to which their purchase
151
See sources cited supra note 121 (citing literature establishing that many individuals
with viable legal claims fail to escalate those claims to more formal stages of dispute
resolution).
152
See Bumiller, supra note 126, at 433-35 (describing discrimination victims’ reluctance
to formally invoke protection of antidiscrimination laws and be labeled as victims).
153
See, e.g., Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., “Broken” Parents Won’t Sue Disney over the Alligator
Attack that Left Their Toddler Dead, WASH. POST (July 20, 2016, 12:10 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/07/20/broken-parents-wontsue-disney-over-the-alligator-attack-that-left-their-toddler-dead/. See generally Engstrom,
supra note 124 (speculating that public nature of civil litigation prompts many victims of legal
wrongs not to sue).
154
It is, however, difficult to disentangle privacy concerns from the many other
disincentives to filing a lawsuit.
155
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (requiring lawyers
to keep their clients “reasonably informed about the status of the matter”).
156
Of course, many plaintiffs proceed pro se. And even when a plaintiff does have counsel,
her relationship with her lawyer may be so plagued by mistrust as to prevent a candid
discussion of the realities of litigation. See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER,
DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS 50-52 (1995) (detailing such dynamics in divorce
context).
157
Cf. Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne & David A. Horne, The Privacy Paradox:
Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 100,
100, 102 (2007) (describing “privacy paradox,” whereby individuals end up revealing more
personal information in various public contexts than they intended).
158
These suppositions accord with more general empirical findings suggesting that
litigants tend to adapt their procedural preferences as they “become more knowledgeable
about the legal system as their cases progress.” Donna Shestowsky, Inside the Mind of the
Client: An Analysis of Litigants’ Decision Criteria for Choosing Procedures, 36 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 69, 81 (2018).
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histories will be shared with other entities, and it would take a thin conception
of consent indeed to maintain that they nonetheless acquiesce to the
dissemination of that information simply by opting to shop online.159 We
likewise shouldn’t presume that plaintiffs consent to probing discovery and
broad publicity absent compelling evidence that they’re cognizant of the
potential indignities of civil litigation when they decide to file suit.
Another objection insists that at least some plaintiffs don’t merely tolerate the
public exposure that comes with prosecuting a lawsuit but eagerly embrace it.
On this view, at least some victims of legal wrongs seek to use civil litigation to
call attention to their injuries and to thereby reclaim control over their selfpresentation.160 Rather than risk being perceived as passive bystanders subject
to the whims of others, they want to be seen as full agents who stand up for
themselves and their rights. Suing those who have wronged them is one of the
most significant (legal) ways of projecting such an image. And whereas some
people might find the public scrutiny during civil litigation humiliating, such
plaintiffs find it empowering. Far from undermining plaintiffs’ dignity-asimage, this objection suggests, civil litigation can promote it. 161
Some plaintiffs may indeed approach their lawsuits with this mindset, but for
many, it seems more aspirational than descriptive. While plaintiffs perhaps
should be encouraged to view all the public exposure during civil litigation as
empowering, many will nevertheless experience it as humiliating. That will be
especially true once they find themselves in the midst of discovery—however
sanguine they may have been when filing their complaints. For one thing,
psychological research suggests that having to repeatedly recount one’s injuries
(physical or emotional) can actually prove discouraging, by preventing one from
“hedonically” adapting to one’s new circumstances. 162 For another, though
159

See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 5-11 (2014) (arguing that, notwithstanding
their seeming allure, mandated disclosures are difficult for individuals to understand).
160
See, e.g., Bender, Tort Law’s Role, supra note 44, at 259.
161
See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass
Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 862 [hereinafter Bender, Feminist
(Re)Torts] (“Only in the courtroom do we acknowledge and reinstate the dignity, respect, and
autonomy of the injured victims in a public way.”); Bender, Tort Law’s Role, supra note 44,
at 259 (“Tort law is potentially an empowering medium for those injured, and it will be
especially empowering for victims of social injustice and dignitary harms.”); cf. Ronen Perry,
Empowerment and Tort Law, 76 TENN. L. REV. 959, 964 (2009) (offering more general
empowerment-based defense of tort law); Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and
Same-Sex Marriage, 123 YALE L.J. 3076, 3092-102 (2014) (describing ways in which civilrights trials allow victims to call attention to humiliation they experience in society).
162
See Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation,
and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 785 (2007) (explaining that personal injury plaintiff’s
testimony regarding her negative feelings can “delay or derail [her] ultimate ability to adapt
to [her] new condition”); Benedict Carey, In Tension of Testimony About Doctor’s Abuses, a
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plaintiffs may feel empowered when initiating an action, they will quickly come
to realize that they enjoy significantly less control over the course of their
lawsuits than they might have supposed. Defendants, after all, have at least as
much say as plaintiffs themselves over how much of plaintiffs’ personal
information comes out during discovery and becomes part of the public record
in the case. So even if some plaintiffs turn to civil litigation as a public forum in
which to overcome their injuries and construct a new self-presentation, there’s
good reason to think that they’ll still be compelled to reveal at least some
personal information they’d rather not share and thus suffer at least some harm
to their dignity-as-image.
Some might also object that the privacy interests comprehended by dignityas-image are a concern of only the wealthy and other powerful members of
society and not of socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals. 163 Although
empirical research does tend to suggest that socioeconomically disadvantaged
individuals are less concerned about their privacy, that could have less to do with
their true preferences than with the fact that the state systematically erodes their
expectations of privacy by intrusively regulating their lives and denigrating their
privacy rights when they try to assert them.164 It seems we should hesitate before
dismissing the privacy interests of entire social groups when the groups’
members have formed their expectations of privacy in unjust circumstances.
Notwithstanding my responses to the foregoing objections, it remains the case
that, as with the dignity-affirming effects of civil litigation,165 the strength of the
dignity-compromising ones will vary from lawsuit to lawsuit, depending on the
nature of the legal claims and various other factors. Civil litigation will, for
instance, prove most humiliating for plaintiffs prosecuting dignitarian claims,
such as sexual assault and defamation, since such claims require the revelation
of especially sensitive personal information. But of course, those are the very
same kinds of cases that are likely to prove the most empowering, since they
most obviously implicate the plaintiff’s standing in society and thus convey the
strongest dignitarian social meaning. It’s precisely when weaker parties are
Potential for Catharsis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2018, at A14 (reviewing conflicting evidence
on psychological effects of narrative).
163
Cf., e.g., Michele Gilman & Rebecca Green, The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of
Extreme Privacy and Data Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 253, 281-82
(2018) (arguing that privacy law originally developed to benefit the wealthy).
164
See, e.g., KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 34 (2017) (criticizing
public welfare programs for intruding into lives of poor mothers and violating their privacy
rights, which were never respected in the first place); Gilman & Green, supra note 163, at 255
(arguing that members of marginalized communities simultaneously are subjected to
increased governmental surveillance yet also fall into “surveillance gap”); Scott SkinnerThompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051, 2056 (2018) (arguing that
privacy tort plaintiffs from marginalized communities face higher burdens than privileged
plaintiffs such as celebrities).
165
See supra Section I.B.
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calling stronger parties to account that the weaker parties run the greatest risk of
having their lower status emphasized, and thus their self-presentation
undermined.
What’s more, given the breadth of discovery, plaintiffs’ dignity-as-image will
likely be compromised even in cases without an obvious dignitarian valence.
Consider employment-discrimination and products-liability cases. When an
employee sues her employer for discrimination, the employer’s response will be
predictable: the employer will contend that it fired the employee not because of
some protected trait, but because she did her job poorly. And to substantiate that
latter claim, the employer will use the discovery process to uncover information
that portrays the employee unfavorably—from her job performance to her
computer use to her activities during breaks and even to aspects of her personal
life.166 Similarly, when a consumer sues a manufacturer for making a defective
product, the manufacturer will attempt to show that the consumer failed to use
the product properly or that some other conduct or preexisting condition
contributed to her injuries—defenses that will tend to damage the consumer’s
public image.167 The indignities of civil litigation thus loom over many kinds of
lawsuits.
C.

Dignity-Dignity Conflicts in Civil Procedure

Appreciating the indignities of civil litigation complicates the dignitarian turn
in recent access-to-justice scholarship. We can now see that the dignitarian turn
presents an incomplete dignitarian account of civil litigation, focusing
myopically on only one aspect of plaintiffs’ dignity: dignity-as-status. In fact,
dignity is a multifaceted concept, and another important facet—dignity-asimage—can directly conflict with dignity-as-status at nearly every stage of civil
litigation. This isn’t to say that we should stop invoking dignity to defend the
value of civil litigation; a concept with conflicting elements isn’t necessarily
incoherent. But it is to suggest that any such defense will end up being much
more complex than proponents of the dignitarian turn seem to think. 168
166

See, e.g., Patrick Dorrian, MGM Grand Worker Must Fork Over Facebook, Other
Social Media, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 18, 2019, 10:38 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com
/product/blaw/document/X37S0TQ0000000 (discussing employee suit under Family and
Medical Leave Act and Americans with Disabilities Act).
167
The same goes for fraud cases: to prove that one was defrauded, one will typically have
to present oneself as a dupe, hardly one’s desired self-presentation. See, e.g., John Gapper,
The Ship Tycoon, the Con Men and a €100m Scam, FIN. TIMES (June 28, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/d4bc5a02-7995-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d (“He was not alone in
being made to look stupid. The judge in the civil case he brought against Sultana called two
Allseas executives who dealt with the fraudsters ‘unbelievably inept and naïve.’ Yet Heerema
defied humiliation and set out to get his money back and to trap those who fooled him.”).
168
Indeed, the complexity exists even before considering dignity-as-image, for civil
litigation can compromise plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status as well as affirm it. For one thing, the
kinds of formalized procedures that plaintiffs must invoke to demand answers from
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That complexity extends from the level of normative foundations to the level
of doctrinal prescriptions. Most obviously, the indignities of civil litigation
should prompt us to question access-to-justice scholars’ nearly unqualified
support for greater publicity, and unqualified opposition to greater secrecy, in
civil procedure.169 To be sure, access-to-justice scholars, including proponents
of the dignitarian turn, occasionally acknowledge the dignitarian costs of
prosecuting a lawsuit, albeit only in passing.170 Rather than temper their
criticisms of procedural secrecy, however, they tend to argue that plaintiffs
simply must bear those costs for the sake of various systemic benefits associated
with publicity in civil litigation.171 This response basically elides the conflict
defendants can themselves prove alienating and even humiliating, particularly for the
members of marginalized and subordinated social groups. Cf., e.g., Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs.
G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990) (exploring similar concerns in context of administrative
hearings regarding government benefits). For another, courts can make mistakes, which
creates the risk that plaintiffs’ demands for answers will be wrongly rebuffed, and even that
their accounts of their injuries will be erroneously discounted or discredited. It might be its
own kind of indignity, distinct from the humiliation considered in the previous two Sections,
to be told (let alone in a public forum) that you were not in fact wronged, and even that you
yourself are to blame for your injuries. Cf. EMILY M. CALHOUN, LOSING TWICE: HARMS OF
INDIFFERENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT 8 (2011) (arguing that Supreme Court has obligation
to avoid harming “constitutional losers” and duty to mitigate unavoidable harms inflicted by
defeat).
These are serious concerns, but they strike me as to some extent inevitable costs of a system
that balances plaintiffs’ interests in holding defendants accountable with defendants’ interests
in not being subjected to specious allegations. In any event, because this Article seeks to
ground the dignitarian turn in policy debates about procedural publicity and secrecy, I focus
on the conflict between dignity-as-status and dignity-as-image, though I do also consider the
potential for recent developments in pleading doctrine to undermine plaintiffs’ dignity-asstatus. See infra Section II.C.2.
169
See, e.g., Resnik, Access, supra note 11, at 611 (seeking to “generat[e] practices and
constitutional doctrine insistent on making dispute resolution processes and outcomes open
to the public”); see also supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (citing access-to-justice
scholars who advocate greater transparency in litigation, arbitration, and settlement).
170
See, e.g., Lahav, Roles of Litigation, supra note 7, at 1659 (conceding, parenthetically,
that “the process of litigation” is “often ugly, ungainly, messy, and expensive”); id. at 166467 (acknowledging “costs of litigation” but without mentioning any dignitarian costs);
Resnik, Courts, supra note 27, at 808 (“The immediate participants in a dispute may find the
exposure to the public disquieting. Even the disclosure of accurate information can be
uncomfortable.”). For similarly perfunctory statements by civil recourse theorists, see, for
example, GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 67, at 53; Hershovitz, Wrongs, supra note 37,
at 41; and Oman, Honor, supra note 43, at 70.
171
See, e.g., LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 20 (“Filing a lawsuit can
impose a stigma on the plaintiff, who is exposed to extreme scrutiny in the course of the
lawsuit. . . . This is an unavoidable cost . . . . [T]he requirement that both parties prove their
case requires that each of them be exposed, answer difficult questions, and reveal information
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between plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status and their dignity-as-image by giving the
latter short shrift.
After demonstrating how that conflict plays out with respect to various
procedural rules and doctrines that allow parties to protect their privacy during
civil litigation, this Section considers several additional doctrinal issues in civil
procedure that aren’t directly concerned with privacy or secrecy but nonetheless
might implicate plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status and dignity-as-image. Exactly how
each issue affects each aspect of plaintiffs’ dignity isn’t a straightforward
question. I don’t attempt a definitive analysis here but seek merely to illustrate
how each issue may require plaintiffs to trade off one aspect of their dignity
against another. The important point is that civil procedure scholars, by
implicitly invoking the concept of dignity to defend broad access to justice,
introduce a tension into their general account of civil procedure while at the very
least complicating some of their positions on specific doctrinal questions.
1. Secrecy in Civil Litigation
The public nature of civil litigation creates a direct dignity-dignity conflict,
which puts pressure on access-to-justice scholars’ opposition to the widespread
use of procedural devices that allow litigants to keep information secret. On the
one hand, while access-to-justice scholars defend publicity primarily on various
consequentialist grounds, plaintiffs also require a degree of publicity in order to
assert their dignity-as-status by calling defendants to account. On the other hand,
although access-to-justice scholars focus most of their criticism on the use of
civil procedure’s privacy protections by defendants, those protections are
equally available to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs can use them to maintain control
over their self-presentation and thus to preserve their dignity-as-image.
Though fairly straightforward, this conflict between plaintiffs’ dignity-asstatus and dignity-as-image plays out in slightly different ways with respect to
different kinds of privacy protections in civil litigation. We can distinguish those
protections along two dimensions: First, the protections differ in terms of the
audience whose access to information they limit, allowing parties to withhold
information from just the public or from the other party to the lawsuit as well.
Second, they also differ in terms of the method they use to protect a party’s
that they prefer to keep hidden.”). And that’s when these scholars even confront the problem
of personal privacy, as opposed to bracketing it altogether. See, e.g., Resnik, Access, supra
note 11, at 606 (“My focus is on the problem of institutional privatization, as contrasted with
questions of individuals’ personal privacy.”). To be sure, in more recent work, Professor
Judith Resnik has nodded to widespread concerns about personal privacy, particularly as
reflected in the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union recognizing a “right to
be forgotten.” See Judith Resnik, The Functions of Publicity and of Privatization in Courts
and Their Replacements (from Jeremy Bentham to #MeToo and Google Spain), in OPEN
JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 177 (Burkhard Hess & Ana
Koprivica Harvey eds., 2019). But her work continues to evince an intense skepticism of
secrecy in civil litigation, and to my knowledge, she has yet to endorse any policy proposal
that would significantly compromise the publicity of adjudicative processes.
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privacy, either suppressing the information at issue altogether or permitting the
dissemination of the information but obscuring the party’s connection to it.
These distinctions yield four possible types of privacy protections in civil
litigation—public/suppress, other party/suppress, public/obscure, and other
party/obscure—which are represented in the following table:
Table 1. Privacy Protections in Civil Litigation.
Methods

Suppress

Obscure

Audience
Public
Other Party
Sealed filings, qualified
protective orders,
Absolute protective orders,
confidential settlements,
evidentiary privileges
courtroom closures
Pseudonymous filings
—

The southeast quadrant (other party/obscure) remains empty because here I’m
considering only procedural devices that allow the parties to a lawsuit (and
particularly plaintiffs) to protect their own privacy. Although it’s possible to
imagine procedural devices that allow nonparties to obscure their connection to
particular information from the view of the parties to a lawsuit as well as the
public (by, say, anonymizing data for which they’ve been subpoenaed),172 such
a strategy is generally unavailable to the parties themselves, who must typically
disclose their identities to each other, if not the public.
I’ll now consider the three other kinds of privacy protections in civil litigation,
showing how each implicates the conflict between plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status
and dignity-as-image.
Public/Suppress. Most privacy-protecting devices in civil litigation allow a
party to a lawsuit to withhold some of his or her personal information from the
public but not from the other party. Parties may, for instance, seek court
permission to make a filing either completely under seal173 or with some of the
information in it redacted from the publicly available version.174 During
discovery, a party may request what I’ll call a qualified protective order—that
is, a protective order that permits the requested discovery but limits who may
see the disclosed information.175 The parties may, with the court’s acquiescence,
172
For an argument that the current discovery rules inadequately protect the privacy of
nonparties whose information is the subject of discovery, see Babette Boliek, Prioritizing
Privacy in the Courts and Beyond, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1101 (2018).
173
FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(d).
174
FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(e)(1).
175
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(E) (“[D]esignating the persons who may be present while the
discovery is conducted . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(F) (“[R]equiring that a deposition be
sealed and opened only on court order . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(H) (“[R]equiring that
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also agree to keep certain information exchanged during discovery
confidential.176 If the parties decide to settle their dispute, they may opt to keep
the terms of their settlement—along with any details of the dispute that have not
already become public—secret, by including a confidentiality clause in the
agreement.177 Finally, if the case proceeds to trial, the court may in certain
circumstances close the courtroom to the public for portions of the
proceedings.178
Some access-to-justice scholars have recently criticized what they see as the
overuse of these privacy-protecting mechanisms, particularly by defendants—
but without fully acknowledging the benefits such mechanisms potentially hold
for plaintiffs. These scholars worry that defendants too often use protective
orders179 and confidentiality clauses in settlement agreements180 to withhold
information about their wrongdoing from the public, thus hindering the public’s
ability to hold them fully accountable and to deter future misconduct. 181 These
the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information in sealed envelopes, to be
opened as the court directs.”).
176
See FED. R. CIV. P. 29(b); Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality,
and Discovery Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2189-92 (2014).
177
See generally Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of
Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 (1999).
178
FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a). The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution guarantees a
right of public access to various criminal trial proceedings. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S.
209, 209 (2010) (per curiam); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press II), 478 U.S. 1, 2
(1986); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 39 (1984); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press
I), 464 U.S. 501, 501-02 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 555
(1980). Every U.S. Court of Appeals to have considered the question has extended that right
to civil trials. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013)
(collecting cases). The right of public access may be abridged only to serve a compelling
governmental interest. See Press II, 478 U.S. at 9.
179
See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (requiring
party to demonstrate only “good cause” to obtain protective order), with Lahav, Roles of
Litigation, supra note 7, at 1688 (acknowledging that “embarrassing information may warrant
protection” but insisting on “compelling” showing).
180
See supra note 10 and accompanying text. For example, Lahav concedes that “[o]f
course there are benefits to secret settlements, as well as costs,” but she then identifies as the
possible benefits only the facts that (1) “[p]laintiffs may obtain a higher recovery in exchange
for secrecy,” (2) “defendants may be able to protect themselves from further liability,” and
(3) requiring publicity might “exacerbate” the tendency of cases involving sensitive
information to “settle before filing . . . without all the information necessary to a fully
informed decision.” Lahav, Roles of Litigation, supra note 7, at 1689. She then criticizes the
current approach for “underestimating the importance of the process of litigation for forcing
information.” Id.
181
For recent examples of questionable invocations of the privacy-protecting mechanisms
by corporate defendants, see Michelle Conlin, Dan Levine & Lisa Girion, Why Big Business
Can Count on Courts to Keep Its Deadly Secrets, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2019, 12:00 PM),

546

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:501

scholars likewise support the strict constitutional standard for limiting public
access to civil trial proceedings, largely on the ground that public court
proceedings provide an important opportunity for ordinary citizens to monitor
the workings of their government.182
The dignitarian turn unsettles this general skepticism toward secrecy in civil
litigation, inviting us to consider the various privacy-protecting mechanisms
from the plaintiff’s perspective. To be sure, plaintiffs who seek a qualified
protective order, agree to a confidentiality provision in a settlement, or testify in
a closed courtroom are potentially making it more difficult to reassert their
dignity-as-status. The information they’re attempting to withhold from the
public is presumably germane to their legal claims; that’s why the defendant still
gets to see it. By limiting the public’s access to that information, plaintiffs
obscure some of the factual bases for demanding answers from the defendant,
and thus somewhat dampen the expressive effects of their lawsuit. 183 At the same
time, however, each of those mechanisms can allow plaintiffs to preserve their
dignity-as-image. Plaintiffs can use qualified protective orders to suppress
information they want to use to make their case against the defendant but fear
might undermine their self-presentation if it became public. They similarly
might accept a confidentiality clause in a settlement agreement because it keeps
private some of the underlying facts in the dispute that might cast them in an
unfavorable light.184 For plaintiffs, each privacy-protecting mechanism presents
a complex trade-off between two different aspects of their dignity.
Other Party/Suppress. The dignity-dignity conflict is less acute when it comes
to the strongest kinds of privacy protections in civil procedure: those that allow
a party to completely withhold certain information from both the public and the

https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-courts-secrecy-lobbyist/.
Other
scholars, approaching the issue from a law-and-economics perspective, have argued that
confidential settlements can actually promote accountability and deterrence. See, e.g., Saul
Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and Sexual
Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 314-21 (2018). But see David A. Hoffman & Erik
Lampann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 171-89 (2019) (arguing that “public
costs” of confidential settlements in sexual harassment cases often outweigh any benefits).
182
See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 63, at 87, 91-92; see also, e.g., David S.
Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 835, 900 (2017)
[hereinafter Ardia, Court Transparency] (“Public access to the courts is essential if the public
is to understand the contours and operation of their government.”).
183
Cf. Hershovitz, Wrongs, supra note 37, at 31 (conceding that confidential settlements
“limit[] the role that tort can play in vindicating the victim’s social standing”).
184
For a provocative (but, in my view, unconvincing) argument that victims of sexual
harassment, by agreeing to confidential settlements, become “complicit” in the perpetrators’
wrongdoing, see Scott Altman, Sexual Harassment NDAs: Privacy, Complicity, and the
Paradox of Blackmail 23 (Univ. of S. Cal. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
19-29, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3444638
[https://perma.cc/7CCJ-2R42].

2020]

THE INDIGNITIES OF CIVIL LITIGATION

547

other party. Such protections include what I’ll call absolute protective orders—
those that forbid outright certain requested discovery185—as well as the
provision of the discovery rules allowing a deponent to seek a court order
terminating a deposition if the questioning becomes too “embarrass[ing].” 186
Because these mechanisms deny even the other party access to the information,
plaintiffs may generally invoke them to withhold only information that is either
immaterial or, at best, tangentially related to their legal claims. As long as the
mechanisms are so limited, plaintiffs can use them to preserve their dignity-asimage without severely compromising their attempt to reassert their dignity-asstatus. But the same dignity-dignity conflict that we saw with qualified
protective orders and other similar devices will recur insofar as plaintiffs also
seek to suppress relevant, if humiliating, information.
Certain evidentiary privileges allow plaintiffs to do exactly that, and so can
present plaintiffs with a direct conflict between the two aspects of their dignity.
Plaintiffs can invoke privileges such as the attorney-client and spousal privileges
to shield some of their confidential communications from their opponents during
discovery.187 When those communications involve sensitive personal
information, and when that information can’t be gleaned from other,
nonprivileged sources, plaintiffs can use the privileges to maintain some control
over their self-presentation and thus to preserve their dignity-as-image. But
when the information plaintiffs seek to suppress is also pertinent to their lawsuit,
they risk dampening the expressive force of their demand for answers and thus
hindering their attempt to reassert their dignity-as-status.
Public/Obscure. Finally, rather than suppress their personal information,
plaintiffs can obscure their connection to it. The main way they can do this is by
prosecuting their lawsuits under a pseudonym, so that their identities, but not the
information they include in their filings or reveal during discovery, are withheld
from the public.188 Although proceeding pseudonymously can be an equally
185
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A) (“forbidding the disclosure or discovery”); FED. R. CIV. P.
26(c)(1)(D) (“forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or
discovery to certain matters”).
186
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3)(A).
187
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (limiting scope of discovery to “nonprivileged matter[s]”).
188
See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
1239 (2010). For recent examples of pseudonymous litigation, see Anemona Hartocollis,
Universities Contest Granting of Anonymity in Sexual Assault Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
2019, at A11; Perry Cooper, Ex-Gymnasts May Stay Anonymous in Olympic Committee Abuse
Suit, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 10, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product
/blaw/document/X9PLTFO4000000; Patrick Dorrian, Jones Day Women Can’t Remain
Anonymous
During
Bias
Probe,
BLOOMBERG BNA (May 31,
2019),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/jones-day-women-cant-remainanonymous-during-firms-bias-probe; and Erin Mulvaney & Hassan A. Kanu, Anonymous
Workplace Harassment Suits Double in #MeToo Era, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 29, 2019, 6:30
AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X50BFH0O000000.
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effective means of protecting their dignity-as-image,189 it comes at a
considerable cost to their dignity-as-status. After all, for civil litigation to
vindicate a plaintiff’s social status as an equal, we need to know who is calling
the defendant to account.190 The dignitarian turn once again ends up highlighting
the benefits as well as the costs of secrecy (or anonymity) for plaintiffs in civil
litigation, demanding a more nuanced account of the practice than access-tojustice scholars have thus far provided.
2. Other Potential Dignity-Dignity Conflicts
Although they might seem to lack a dignitarian dimension, several other
procedural issues on which access-to-justice scholars have recently focused may
also present a conflict between plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status and dignity-asimage. The severity of any conflict will depend on various empirical facts about
current civil practice, and a complete normative analysis of these issues would
require consideration of other values besides dignity. But we should nevertheless
appreciate the potential for the dignitarian turn to complicate standard accessto-justice positions on issues beyond secrecy in civil litigation.
Arbitration and Contracting for Dignity-as-Image. Arbitration implicates
plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status and dignity-as-image because it occurs largely in
secret. Whereas much of a lawsuit unfolds in public view, with filings generally
made available to the public and testimony generally taken in open court,
arbitration proceedings are almost completely opaque. The model rules of the
major arbitration organizations generally bar members of the public from
attending arbitrations,191 and arbitration clauses can contain confidentiality

189
Cf. Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity, 101 VA. L. REV. 691,
692 (2015) (arguing that Fourth Amendment should be construed to protect individuals’
anonymity as well as their privacy).
190
Cf. Strahilevitz, supra note 188, at 1252 (noting that in pseudonymous cases, “the
victim chooses to mask her identity, thereby substantially curtailing the ability of third-party
adjudication to enhance her social status”).
191
See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES, at R-25 (2013), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/CommercialRules_
Web_FINAL_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9YA-VNTZ] (“The arbitrator and the AAA shall
maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the law provides to the contrary.”); AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, at R-30 (2014), https://www.adr.org
/sites/default/files/Consumer_Rules_Web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY7N-43YB] (“The
arbitrator and the AAA will keep information about the arbitration private except to the extent
that a law provides that such information shall be shared or made public.”); JAMS,
COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, at r. 26 (2014),
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_comprehensive_
arbitration_rules-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FL2-WY44] (“JAMS and the Arbitrator shall
maintain the confidential nature of the Arbitration proceeding and the Award, including the
Hearing, except as necessary in connection with a judicial challenge to or enforcement of an
Award, or unless otherwise required by law or judicial decision.”). Arbitration proceedings
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provisions restricting the participants’ ability to publicly reveal what occurs
during the proceedings.192 Many civil procedure scholars worry that such
secrecy insulates arbitration from any kind of public scrutiny.193 Most
prominently, Professor Judith Resnik, drawing on the work of Jeremy Bentham,
has argued that the secrecy of arbitration forgoes one of the main benefits of
public adjudication: the chance for members of the public to “watch” their
government “in action” so that they can hold it accountable.194 “Unlike courts,”
Resnik laments, arbitration is typically structured so that “third parties can
neither attend nor inspect records (if made) of proceedings, opinions are not
published, and parties may be subject to admonitions of confidentiality.” 195 Of
course that is often one of the main reasons parties elect to resolve a dispute
through arbitration rather than in a court—as Resnik herself recognizes.196 But
she nevertheless maintains that any benefits of secrecy for the parties are
outweighed by the forgone benefits of publicity for the public, decrying
arbitration as a “confidential dispute resolution service[] that obliterate[s] the
chance for an audience to learn about what transpired.”197
were, however, more public earlier in American history. See Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding
Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the
Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 423, 445-46 (2009).
192
Some empirical studies, however, have found that only a small minority of arbitration
clauses contain such confidentiality provisions. See STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA R.
LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION LAW § 37(b), at 122 (1st ed. 2017) (citing study
finding “confidentiality provisions in only 13.5% of arbitration agreements studied”).
Although in theory some of the contents of an arbitration can become public if an action to
confirm, vacate, or modify the arbitral award is filed, see 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2018), only a “small
fraction” of all arbitrations end up being litigated in court. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra
note 61, at 2899; see also infra note 286 and accompanying text.
193
According to some scholars, such criticisms overstate the secrecy of arbitration and
understate the degree to which information revealed during an arbitration can eventually
become public. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth,
54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1299 (2006); Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in
Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1219 (2006).
194
See, e.g., Resnik, Access, supra note 11, at 616-18.
195
Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 63, at 111; see also LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF
LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 73; Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 61, at 2857-59, 2900.
196
See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 61, at 2811.
197
Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements, supra note 63, at 994-95; see also Resnik, Courts,
supra note 27, at 799-802; Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 63, at 132; Resnik,
Uncovering, supra note 8, at 549-51. For similar arguments, see generally Laurie Kratky
Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Light Shine in on
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463 (2006); and Ramona L. Lampley,
“Underdog” Arbitration: A Plan for Transparency, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1727 (2015). Resnik
has leveled similar criticisms against “court-annexed” ADR. See Resnik, Access, supra note
11, at 637-40; Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the
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The dignitarian turn simultaneously buttresses and undercuts this Benthamite
critique of arbitration. On the one hand, consistent with that critique, secrecy in
arbitration hinders (would-be) plaintiffs in their attempts to reassert their
dignity-as-status. While arbitration still enables plaintiffs to demand and compel
answers from defendants,198 they can’t fully assert their standing as equals
entitled to an explanation for their injuries in private; as an expressive value,
dignity-as-status can’t be fully vindicated without at least some public
recognition of an individual’s equal social standing.199 On the other hand, given
arbitration’s relative secrecy and strict limits on discovery, plaintiffs can
maintain almost complete control over how much of their personal information
becomes public, and thus avoid compromising their dignity-as-image, as they
seek redress for their injuries. One could thus understand the decision to sign a
contract containing an arbitration clause as a decision to sacrifice the opportunity
to fully vindicate one’s dignity-as-status for the ability to preserve one’s dignityas-image—a trade-off I’ll call contracting for dignity-as-image.200

Experiences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631, 1656
(2015); Resnik, Uncovering, supra note 8, at 551-60.
198
Hence my focus here on arbitration, as opposed to other forms of ADR. Rather than
enable victims to hold wrongdoers accountable by demanding answers, other forms of ADR—
particularly mediation—seek to “reconfigure” or “transform” disputes so the parties can reach
a voluntary, collaborative resolution. See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P.
FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT (2d
rev. ed. 2005). That aspiration can be understood as in a sense dignitarian, in that mediation
purports to be less adversarial and thus more “dignified” than arbitration (let alone litigation),
but that’s a different notion of dignity from the status-based notion emphasized by the
dignitarian turn in access-to-justice scholarship. And while mediation, like arbitration, occurs
in private, it uses secrecy not to protect the parties’ privacy per se, but to create an
environment that restores trust and fosters communication between the parties.
199
For a compelling recent argument along somewhat different lines, but also invoking
Waldron’s status-based conception of dignity, see Erik Encarnacion, Boilerplate Indignity, 94
IND. L.J. 1305, 1332-39 (2019). Professor Encarnacion’s dignitarian critique of arbitration,
however, is limited to arbitration clauses found in “boilerplate” contracts and doesn’t directly
address the secrecy of arbitral proceedings. More generally, unlike the dignitarian turn
identified and developed in this Article, Encarnacion’s dignitarian argument focuses primarily
on courts’ role in “vindicating” and recognizing victims’ dignity (a function that has become
less central in the era of the vanishing civil trial), id. at 1308, as opposed to those aspects of
civil procedure that allow victims to publicly demand answers from wrongdoers. Nor does he
consider dignity-as-image and the questions it raises for our understanding of both civil
litigation and arbitration, not to mention the value of dignity itself.
200
Here, I bracket the longstanding debate over whether arbitration clauses that appear in
consumer and employment contracts of adhesion constitute genuine contractual agreements.
Whatever one’s position on that question, the point still stands that the secrecy of arbitration
proceedings can confer an important dignitarian benefit on parties subject to arbitration
clauses.
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It’s difficult to say which of arbitration’s dignitarian effects—the costs to
plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status or the benefits for their dignity-as-image—will
prevail in any given case. Of course, the potential upside for plaintiffs’ dignityas-image, and thus the dignity-dignity conflict, is likely to be most significant in
those disputes whose resolution turns on particularly sensitive personal
information, such as disputes among family members. 201 The conflict will, by
contrast, be less acute in disputes that can be resolved based on more routine
information, such as many consumer disputes. Even in those seemingly anodyne
cases, however, there’s always a significant risk that plaintiffs will be forced to
divulge personal information they’d rather not share if they bring their claims in
court, given the potential breadth of discovery.202 Plaintiffs will thus face the
trade-off between their dignity-as-status and their dignity-as-image, and the
temptation to contract for the latter by agreeing to private arbitration and
forgoing public adjudication, in a wide range of disputes.
Plausibility Pleading and Procedural Paternalism. Because the privacyprotecting doctrines in ordinary civil litigation and the confidentiality rules
governing arbitration are directly concerned with publicity and secrecy in
dispute resolution, they obviously implicate both aspects of plaintiffs’ dignity.
But even procedural doctrines that ostensibly have nothing to do with secrecy
can create a conflict between plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status and their dignity-asimage and thereby complicate some of the policy positions espoused by accessto-justice scholars.
Pleading rules may be one such doctrine. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly203
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,204 the Supreme Court construed the general pleading
standard in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure205 to require a plaintiff’s
complaint to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.”206 Access-to-justice scholars have almost uniformly criticized this
requirement, particularly for making it more difficult for plaintiffs with
201
See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious
Arbitration Paradigm, 124 YALE L.J. 2994, 3012 (2015) (“[A]rbitration can allow parties to
select a process of dispute resolution that ensures sensitive decisions reflect personal family
values and ideals.”).
202
According to Resnik,
[W]hen a repeat player is in conflict with a one-shot actor (for example, when a wireless
service provider is challenged on billing by a customer), the only privacy interest is a
provider’s desire not to have other similarly-situated consumers know of the harms
alleged, the positions taken, or the remedies accorded.
Resnik, Access, supra note 11, at 643 (emphasis added). Not necessarily. To take Resnik’s
own example, the customer may want to avoid publicly disclosing the phone numbers (and
thus the identities of those whom she was calling) that appear on the disputed bill.
203
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
204
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
205
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
206
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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potentially meritorious claims to obtain the discovery they need to substantiate
their allegations.207 According to this criticism, the plausibility requirement puts
plaintiffs to a Catch-22: to survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss and obtain
discovery, they already need to know enough of the underlying facts to render
their claims for relief “plausible,” but to get those factual details, they often need
access to the tools of discovery.
Such concerns dovetail with the dignitarian turn. Especially in the era of the
vanishing civil trial, discovery provides plaintiffs with the most significant
opportunity during civil litigation to demand answers from defendants and
compel responses. Insofar as a heightened pleading standard deprives plaintiffs
with potentially meritorious claims of that opportunity, it prevents them from
fully asserting their dignity-as-status. Plaintiffs will, to be sure, still receive some
kind of response from the defendant, in the form of a motion to dismiss. But
such a motion must assume the truth of the plaintiff’s factual allegations,208 and
so it will necessarily fail to provide all the answers or the full accounting the
plaintiff is seeking. A heightened pleading standard thus risks foreclosing a
critical opportunity to assert one’s dignity-as-status even in cases where the
plaintiff has a legitimate demand for an explanation.
And yet, more subtly, a heightened pleading standard might also sometimes
safeguard plaintiffs’ dignity-as-image, sparing them from many of the
indignities of civil litigation. It can do so by limiting the duration of any
humiliation they must suffer at the hands of the defendant. If plaintiffs can’t
plead factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief, then their
lawsuits are cut short before discovery, where the defendant could compel them
to disclose information that undermines their public image and that they’d rather
keep private. Any humiliation is confined to the facts plaintiffs themselves
choose to include in their complaint. One can understand this consequence of
the plausibility standard as a kind of procedural paternalism: it protects (one
aspect of) plaintiffs’ dignity by insulating them from the travails of discovery
when it judges that their claims are unlikely to succeed and thus unlikely to
warrant the significant intrusions into their privacy that characterize pretrial
procedure, yet it’s arguably paternalistic because plaintiffs themselves
207

See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 876 (2009); Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109
MICH. L. REV. 53, 56 (2010); Reinert, supra note 46, at 1769; Adam N. Steinman, The
Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2010). Professor Benjamin Spencer has
elaborated this criticism at length. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward
Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 187 (2009); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV.
1710, 1713-14 (2013); A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) [hereinafter Spencer, Understanding]. Here I bracket the extensive
empirical debate over whether Twombly and Iqbal have in fact had these effects. See generally
Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV.
369 (2016).
208
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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presumably would prefer to proceed to discovery, even if they may not fully
appreciate what they’re getting into by pressing on.
To be sure, as a means of safeguarding plaintiffs’ dignity-as-image, a
heightened pleading requirement that applies in all kinds of civil cases is wildly
overbroad. The main problem is that it assesses plaintiffs’ claims, and thus
determines whether vindicating those claims is worth enduring the indignities of
civil litigation, before all the facts of the dispute have been ascertained. Indeed,
given typical information asymmetries, the defendant may possess facts that
would ultimately corroborate the plaintiff’s allegations, and that might even
prove so humiliating for the defendant as to overshadow any humiliation
suffered by the plaintiff, but that will never come to light if the lawsuit is
precipitously terminated. The plausibility standard’s procedural paternalism
thus promises to protect plaintiffs’ dignity-as-image based on an incomplete
picture of both the strength of their claims and the magnitude of the dignitarian
risks they would incur by proceeding with their lawsuits.
There are, however, other doctrinal mechanisms, short of a universal
plausibility standard, that could protect plaintiffs’ privacy and shield them from
humiliation, but at less cost to their dignity-as-status. For example, Professor
Richard Nagareda suggested that the plausibility standard should apply only to
lawsuits raising claims based on publicly available information and that the more
liberal pre-Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard should govern lawsuits in which
plaintiffs need discovery to obtain privately held information in order to
substantiate their claims.209 This more nuanced rule would limit the plausibility
standard’s paternalistic effects to those cases in which it could make the most
difference for plaintiffs’ dignity-as-image—namely, cases in which plaintiffs
don’t need significant discovery to substantiate their claims, and so probably
shouldn’t have to endure intrusive discovery if they can’t even plead a plausible
claim based on publicly available information. If, by contrast, a case turns on
privately held information, then undergoing the ordeal of discovery is just an
inevitable cost of demanding answers and seeking redress through civil
litigation.
In a similar vein, others have proposed applying the plausibility standard in
every case but allowing courts to order limited discovery before adjudicating a
defendant’s motion to dismiss.210 This approach would enable plaintiffs to at
least partly substantiate the allegations in their complaint, and thus to bolster
their demand for answers, but without having to subject themselves to the most
intrusive kinds of discovery and any attendant humiliation. Appreciating the
trade-off between plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status and dignity-as-image may thus
provide additional support for proposals that seek to preserve some of the
209

See Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex
Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 681-82 (2011).
210
See Dodson, supra note 207, at 56; Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller, An
Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 437, 448-52
(2013).
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benefits of the plausibility pleading standard while minimizing its costs to
access-to-justice values.
The Anonymity of Aggregate Litigation. Just as privacy-protecting doctrines
in civil litigation, arbitration’s confidentiality rules, and the plausibility pleading
standard can all undermine plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status while safeguarding their
dignity-as-image, the class action—a procedural device that access-to-justice
scholars champion—can have similar dignitarian effects. Ironically, the
dignitarian case for class actions may be stronger when we attend to the facet of
dignity that proponents of the dignitarian turn have tended to neglect—dignityas-image—as opposed to the status-based aspect of dignity that implicitly
underlies their advocacy of broad access to civil justice and their opposition to
procedural secrecy.
On the one hand, class actions can undermine plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status. To
be sure, according to the standard access-to-justice justification, class actions
empower plaintiffs, leveling the playing field with defendants by aggregating
claims that aren’t worth litigating on an individual basis but that do warrant a
lawsuit when combined with other, similar claims. 211 This pragmatic rationale
resonates with the dignitarian turn, for in allowing plaintiffs to band together,
class actions offset power disparities that would otherwise prevent plaintiffs
from demanding answers from defendants, much less obtaining relief.212
The problem with this argument as a dignitarian defense of the class action,
however, is that it ignores the extent to which aggregate litigation deprives most
class members of opportunities to participate directly in a lawsuit, and thus to
demand answers from the defendant in any meaningful sense. Although
plaintiffs’ demands for answers are always mediated whenever plaintiffs are
represented by a lawyer,213 the demand is even more attenuated in a class action.
The vast majority of the class members are “absent” from the litigation,
represented by the class representative or named plaintiff and her lawyers rather
than participating themselves.214 If the class complaint seeks damages, a class
member may, upon notice, enter an appearance through a lawyer or even opt out
of the class litigation altogether—but only if he affirmatively takes those steps;
the default is that a class member will remain a mere bystander to the litigation
and yet be bound by its outcome without having ever set foot in court.215 The

211

See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 688 (1941).
212
See, e.g., LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 121-22; Lahav, Symmetry,
supra note 46, at 1499; Resnik, Access, supra note 11, at 677.
213
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
214
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3), (4).
215
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2)(B).
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upshot is that “participation—much less control—is cursory, at best, in largescale litigation.”216
Given the nature of representation in a class action, absent class members
miss out on all the opportunities for reasserting their dignity that access-tojustice scholars see in civil litigation. Absent class members cannot shape the
allegations of the complaint, sit across the table from the defendant as he’s
deposed, or confront the defendant at trial. If they can be understood to be
demanding explanations and reasserting their equal standing at these various
stages at all, it is only vicariously, through the named plaintiff prosecuting the
lawsuit on their behalf. Such virtual participation is unlikely to be perceived by
the defendant or members of the public as a calling to account by the absent class
members themselves, and so is unlikely to convey the right kind of social
meaning for the litigation to realize their dignity as well as that of the named
plaintiff.
The alternative to virtual participation, of course, is often not direct
participation, but no litigation at all, since class claims are frequently too small
to warrant individual lawsuits. At the very least, though, the dignitarian turn
offers additional support for proposals that would permit greater participation
by absent class members in class litigation—not only because such participation
promotes certain process-oriented conceptions of fairness by affording absent
class members a greater say in the conduct of the lawsuit,217 but also because it
allows them to lend their voices to the named plaintiff’s demand for an
explanation and to thereby put their equal social standing on the line in the
litigation as well.
On the other hand, the very same features of class actions that undermine
absent class members’ dignity-as-status also protect their dignity-as-image.
Ordinary, nonaggregate litigation puts the focus on individual plaintiffs, inviting

216

Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Calibrating Participation: Reflections on Procedure
Versus Procedural Justice, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 323, 335 (2016); see also Alexandra D. Lahav,
The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3193, 3203-04 (2013);
Lahav, Symmetry, supra note 46, at 1519; cf. Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court”
Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 236-79 (1992) (arguing that class
actions substitute representation for personal participation and consequently forgo dignitarian
benefits of participation). But see LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 90-98
(identifying other opportunities to participate in collective litigation); Elizabeth J. Cabraser &
Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846, 847-52 (2017);
Adam Klein, Olivia Quinto & Nantiya Ruan, Individualized Justice in Class and Collective
Actions, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, supra note 92, at 326
(discussing importance of individual voices in class actions); Alexandra D. Lahav,
Participation and Procedure, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 513, 513-15 (2015).
217
See, e.g., Burch, supra note 216, at 330-35 (discussing psychological research by
Professor Tom Tyler on individuals’ perceptions of “procedural justice”); supra note 39 and
accompanying text (discussing Jerry Mashaw’s dignitiarian defense of participatory
procedures).

556

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:501

members of the public to attend to the facts of their specific injuries. 218 As we’ve
seen, such attention can be empowering, providing a public audience for
plaintiffs’ demands for answers, but it can also be humiliating, exposing to
public view personal information that is inconsistent with their self-presentation.
Class actions, by contrast, afford absent class members the anonymity of
aggregate litigation.219 Although, technically, each class member must have
suffered her own injury to be entitled to any portion of the class-wide relief, the
nature of class litigation abstracts from those individual injuries and aggregates
them into a single (if multifaceted) injury to “the class”; the public’s attention is
diverted away from what the defendant did to any individual class member and
toward what the defendant did to all the class members as a group.220 This
aggregate focus permeates the specific procedures for litigating class claims—
at least where absent class members are permitted to opt out of the litigation as
opposed to being required to opt in.221 If a class is certified as an opt-out class,
absent class members need not take any affirmative steps to benefit from any
finding of liability against the defendant or to be entitled to a remedy, each of
which is generally determined on a class-wide basis. While they may have to
submit a publicly available claim to collect their share of any class award or
settlement, they won’t have to recount the specific details of their injuries in a
complaint or subject themselves to the full extent of discovery, as they would if
they were proceeding individually. It’s a very different story for the named
plaintiffs, who must endure the indignities of civil litigation like any other
plaintiff. If anything, the class action augments their humiliation, concentrating

218
Cf. Catherine A. Rogers, Proposals to Expel Palestinians from the Occupied Territories
as Catalyst for a Civil Adjudication Campaign, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 167, 183 (2003)
(“By providing for the assertion of individual claims, civil litigation can shift the focus
from . . . a group . . . to individuals who have suffered identifiable and particularized
harms.”).
219
Cf. Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from
the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1547 (2016) (“[C]lass actions afford anonymity to
individual workers who might fear retaliation [by their employers] should they pursue a claim
individually.”).
220
Cf. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1291 (1976) (“[T]he class action responds to the proliferation of more or less wellorganized groups in our society and the tendency to perceive interests as group interests, at
least in very important aspects.”); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an
Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1681 (2001) (discussing analogous concept of
“aggregate harm”); Lisset M. Pino, Comment, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: The Feminist Case
Against Individualized Adjudication, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 401, 404-05 (2018) (arguing
that class actions in sex-discrimination cases highlight “institutional dimension of
discrimination”).
221
Cf. Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171, 202
(2016) (identifying preservation of class members’ “anonymity” as reason to have opt-out,
rather than opt-in, class).
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the injuries of hundreds and sometimes even thousands of individuals on just a
few. For the vast majority of the members of any given class, however, the class
device allows them to band together to obtain at least some compensation for
their injuries without having to emphasize their own circumstances or publicly
reveal their personal information.222
One might doubt that the typical class action turns on the kind of personal
information that most plaintiffs care about keeping secret and that consequently
threatens to humiliate them if publicly exposed. Does a plaintiff really face a
significant risk of humiliation by prosecuting an individual lawsuit against a
company that, say, sold her a television on terms that violated various consumerprotection laws (precisely the kind of small claim that is the bread and butter of
class action litigation)? Perhaps not. But even some small consumer claims can
be fraught, such as when the claims concern drugs taken for some embarrassing
condition.223 Most victims in such cases may well prefer to stand back and let
the named plaintiffs represent their interests. In any event, pursuing any kind of
claim can expose a plaintiff to significant public scrutiny, given the tendency of
discovery to stray beyond the facts most immediately relevant to the lawsuit.
The anonymity of aggregate litigation thus promises to safeguard plaintiffs’
dignity-as-image in a wide range of cases.224

222

The anonymity of aggregate litigation is, however, somewhat compromised by court
decisions strictly applying the requirement that a proposed class’s members be sufficiently
“ascertainable” before the class can be certified. See Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class Action
Limits: Parsing the Debates over Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 92328 (2017). The Supreme Court’s recent ratcheting up of the other class-certification
requirements has had a similar effect, increasingly putting the focus on the individual
members of a proposed class and the amenability of their claims to class treatment. See, e.g.,
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338, 360 (2011); Anne E. Ralph, The Story of a Class: Use of Narrative in Public Interest
Class Actions Before Certification, 95 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3447234
[https://perma.cc/95FNVC65] (describing lawyers’ increasing use of “narrative” to highlight circumstances of
individual class members as way of satisfying heightened certification requirements imposed
by decisions such as Wal-Mart).
223
See, e.g., Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 139 S. Ct. 710, 713 (2019) (considering
appeal of certification of class action concerning dietary supplement used to increase “sexual
energy”).
224
Plaintiffs can confront a similar trade-off between the two aspects of their dignity when
their lawsuits are consolidated with other cases involving similar issues for pretrial
proceedings under the federal multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(2018), an increasingly prevalent practice in mass-tort cases. While the informal aggregation
of MDLs deprives most plaintiffs of the opportunity to directly call the defendant to account
(which is even more disconcerting in the MDL context than the class action context, given
that most MDLs include many claims that are individually viable), it affords much of the
anonymity of an opt-out class action.
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III. CIVIL PROCEDURE’S UNDIGNIFIED PATH TO DIGNITY
Even as proponents of the dignitarian turn in access-to-justice scholarship
emphasize civil litigation’s capacity to realize one important aspect of plaintiffs’
dignity, they largely ignore its tendency to compromise another, along with the
resulting complications for their positions on various procedural issues. Why
does the dignitarian turn overlook the indignities of civil litigation? The neglect,
I suspect, stems from the egalitarian commitments that underlie our legal order
and likely motivate civil procedure scholars to defend civil litigation in
dignitarian terms. The dignitarian turn obviously resonates with our society’s
broader commitment to legal equality, the principle that everyone is equal before
the law regardless of her socioeconomic status.225 By allowing even the weakest
members of society to call even the most powerful ones to account, civil
litigation embodies that principle more fully than perhaps any of our other
political institutions. To fully acknowledge the indignities of civil litigation, one
might worry, would be to concede that the price of maintaining one’s legal
equality is quite steep indeed—that one must be willing to subject oneself to
intense public scrutiny, and to sacrifice one’s privacy and potentially undermine
one’s public image, in order to be recognized as an equal member of the political
community with the standing to hold others accountable.
It turns out, however, that the indignities of civil litigation aren’t just an
inevitable cost of asserting one’s dignity-as-status. This Part argues that the
indignities of civil litigation can, paradoxically, have a dignitarian upside for
weaker plaintiffs suing more powerful defendants. In conditions of
socioeconomic inequality such as those that characterize our society, weaker
plaintiffs can exploit the indignities of civil litigation to more effectively demand
answers from more powerful defendants. They can, in particular, choose to
humiliate themselves—deliberately revealing personal information that
undermines their public image—and thereby shame the defendant into providing
a less dismissive response than they otherwise might have received. By willingly
compromising their dignity-as-image, weaker plaintiffs can more forcefully
assert their dignity-as-status and, in doing so, better secure their legal equality.
Section III.A explains how plaintiffs can shame defendants by humiliating
themselves during civil litigation, while Section III.B considers some
implications for the doctrinal issues considered in the previous Part.
A.

Exploiting the Indignities of Civil Litigation

This Section will show how weaker plaintiffs can shame more powerful
defendants by humiliating themselves during civil litigation. After explaining
the general structure of shaming practices, I’ll apply those insights to civil
litigation. I’ll then argue that this expressive account of civil litigation can be
reconciled with our commitment to legal equality.

225
Cf. WALDRON, supra note 70, at 55-61 (linking status-based conception of dignity to
legal equality).
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1. Shaming by Complaining
Certain social practices have the capacity to shame: they allow some members
of a social group to express their opprobrium of other members who offend the
group’s norms.226 Consider the longstanding debate over the use of “shaming
sanctions” in criminal law.227 On one influential account, all criminal
punishment is at least partly expressive, in that it communicates the political
community’s condemnation of the offender for having violated the community’s
moral norms.228 Building on this insight, some scholars have argued that
shaming sanctions are just an alternative way of expressing this condemnatory
message, subjecting the offender to intense, formalized public ridicule rather
than depriving him of his liberty.229
Criminal punishment, however, is far from the only social practice with this
kind of expressive power. As Professor William Miller has shown, certain
ritualized practices of complaining can be used to shame errant members of a
social group230—an account with implications for civil procedure.231 Miller
focuses on “formalized complaints made in an attempt to get back what you are
owed,” and he is particularly concerned with the problem of how to “compel a
person to repay a debt or to deliver on a promise he has made,” especially when
the debtor is more powerful—“a big man.”232 He develops his account by
analyzing how a weaker creditor can use “penitential rituals of self-abnegation,
like fasting, donning sackcloth, defacing oneself with dirt and ashes, and]
rending one’s garments or flesh . . . to shame [a more powerful debtor] into
fulfilling his promises or doing his duty by ostentatiously degrading oneself in
his presence.”233 According to Miller, such rituals all exhibit the same basic
normative structure: “The complainant humiliates himself in order to shame the
person he is pleading to.”234 I’ll consider each element in turn.
First, the complainant humiliates himself by publicly emphasizing his lower
social status vis-à-vis the more powerful debtor. As discussed above,
humiliation in this sense means the “deflation of pretension”—the exposure of
226

See NUSSBAUM, supra note 98, at 203-07 (discussing shaming sanctions).
See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 631
(1996).
228
For a classic account, see JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in
DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 95-118 (1970).
229
See generally Kahan, supra note 227, at 630-51.
230
WILLIAM IAN MILLER, Complaining Against the Most High, in LOSING IT 107, 107
(2011) [hereinafter MILLER, Complaining]; see also MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 104,
at 161-65 (examining humiliation and shaming rituals).
231
Indeed, Miller himself likens the practices he considers to “filing a formal legal
complaint.” MILLER, Complaining, supra note 230, at 107.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 108.
234
Id. at 117.
227
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personal information that is inconsistent with your public image or selfpresentation.235 When you’re humiliated, you’re caught in a kind of upward
pretension: your personal information is publicly revealed against your will,
showing you to occupy a lower social status than your public image would have
suggested. When, by contrast, you humiliate yourself, you intentionally disclose
such personal information, calling public attention to your lower status. The
practices Miller considers involve particularly extreme forms of this kind of selfhumiliation, as the complainant abases himself in order to proclaim his
impotence, to make clear that he has no other recourse for the wrong he has
suffered.236 This is the sense in which Miller classifies “rituals of selfabasement” as a kind of “humiliation ritual.”237
Second, this self-humiliation has a point: the complainant seeks to use his
self-humiliation to shame the more powerful debtor. Shame here refers not only
to a subjective emotion on the part of the powerful individual, but also to an
objective judgment by the other members of the relevant community that he
failed to honor the community’s norms.238 For the lower-status creditor to be
able to shame the more powerful debtor, both must be members of a community
governed by a set of shared norms, norms that go beyond mere social
conventions and rise to the level of something like morality itself. 239 So while
the participants in a shaming ritual are profoundly unequal in the sense that they
enjoy different degrees of social power, they are equal in the sense that they are
both subject to the same set of important social norms.
The weaker complainant uses self-humiliation to reestablish this equality. By
humiliating himself in order to highlight his social weakness, he seeks to claim
a degree of moral strength—to declare that he has complied with the
community’s moral norms, whereas the more powerful debtor has flouted them.
He does so by calling attention not simply to the powerful individual’s original
transgression—the failure to repay a debt or to keep a promise—but to the
further wrong of driving a weaker individual to (potentially harmful) selfhumiliation. He humiliates himself in order to show how the powerful individual
has compounded the original transgression by obstinately spurning his
legitimate demands for recompense. On Miller’s account, a weaker party can
use a shaming ritual to tap into society’s moral hierarchy in order to transcend

235
MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 104, at 137; see also supra notes 104-05 and
accompanying text.
236
MILLER, Complaining, supra note 230, at 114-15 (analyzing rituals of “sitting dharna”
and “fasting against,” which involve inflicting or threatening self-harm and may even result
in death).
237
MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 104, at 161.
238
See id. at 101, 196; see also Austin, supra note 106, at 7 (distinguishing between
“normative judgments involved in questions of shame—whether one ought to be ashamed of
something—and the feeling of shame itself”).
239
See MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 104, at 118-19.
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his low position in the social hierarchy and vindicate his rights against a stronger
party.
To be sure, the stronger party might prove “impervious to feeling much shame
on account of such a lowly soul,” but the weaker party’s self-humiliation is also
meant to be “embarrassing and painful for those witnessing it” and “hard
for . . . [them] to endure,” so that they’ll pressure the superior to capitulate and
end their “discomfort” at the spectacle.240 Shaming rituals are thus necessarily
public: they presume an audience composed of other members of the relevant
normative community who can either appeal, by their mere presence, to the more
powerful individual’s sense of honor or, if that fails, force him to relent through
more direct forms of social pressure.241
2. Shaming Through Civil Litigation
Miller’s account of shaming practices seems far removed from contemporary
civil litigation, and of course it is. I want to suggest, however, that it nevertheless
holds important lessons for civil litigation—lessons that are made all the more
relevant by the dignitarian turn in access-to-justice scholarship. The dignitarian
turn helpfully calls attention to the dignitarian dimension of civil litigation but
largely ignores its downside for plaintiffs; Miller’s account of shaming practices
suggests a way in which plaintiffs can turn that downside to their advantage. In
particular, without going to the lengths of the kinds of self-abnegation involved
in the practices Miller considers, weaker plaintiffs can still exploit the indignities
of civil litigation to humiliate themselves and thereby shame more powerful
defendants into responding more fully to their demands for answers. By
compromising their dignity-as-image, they can more effectively assert their
dignity-as-status.
A degree of humiliation is often implicit in the very act of filing a lawsuit.
When individual plaintiffs sue a more powerful defendant, such as a corporation,
they tacitly concede their powerlessness. After all, litigation is a last resort for
most people, an option to be pursued only after exhausting all other (formal and
informal) avenues of redress. To have to sue someone is often to acknowledge
that one lacks the social status necessary to obtain redress on one’s own, without
the aid of a higher authority.242 As in the practices analyzed by Miller, a civil

240

MILLER, Complaining, supra note 230, at 117.
Cf. JILL LOCKE, DEMOCRACY AND THE DEATH OF SHAME: POLITICAL EQUALITY AND
SOCIAL DISTURBANCE 19 (2016) (“I understand shame in this context as a felt ethic of
obligation and regulation that involves an actual or internalized audience that judges one’s
thoughts and acts in terms of their relationship to norms or standards that one shares (or is
expected to share) with others.” (emphasis omitted)).
242
See supra note 126 and accompanying text; cf. Hershovitz, Wrongs, supra note 37, at
16 (“[A] tort suit casts the plaintiff in the role of the kid, who needs to go to his teacher for
help, and we all know there is no honor in that.”); Julian Pitt-Rivers, Honour and Social
Status, in HONOUR AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY 21, 30 (J.G.
241
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complaint implicitly accuses the defendant of exploiting his power advantage in
order to avoid having to compensate, or at least explain himself to, the plaintiff.
Such an accusation is, presumably, inconsistent with most plaintiffs’ public
image; most people don’t seek to present themselves as powerless and subject
to others’ whims. The act of filing a lawsuit thus has a more ambiguous social
meaning than the dignitarian turn suggests—an act of self-empowerment,243 yes,
but also one of self-humiliation.244
Even more significant are the opportunities for self-humiliation during the
litigation itself. As explained in Part II, many plaintiffs will be humiliated as the
defendant uses the tools of discovery to uncover personal information that
undermines their self-presentation and then exposes much of that information to
public view. But plaintiffs can use that same process to humiliate themselves by
deliberately revealing such information. Intentionally revealing your sensitive
personal information can prove humiliating in two respects: First, like the act of
filing a lawsuit, deliberately violating your own privacy emphasizes your
relative powerlessness, your inability to vindicate your rights without subjecting
yourself to public scrutiny. Second, the personal information you willingly
reveal can compromise your dignity-as-image insofar as it emphasizes your
lower status. That will often be true of information concerning the injuries
plaintiffs have suffered at the hands of the defendant, as well as information that
doesn’t directly pertain to their legal claims but nonetheless casts them as
socially weaker than the defendant and vulnerable to his superior social power.
Discovery can thus provide an opportunity for its own kind of self-abnegation—
not the denial of bodily goods, as in the practices Miller considers, but rather the
denial of the dignitarian good of privacy. 245
By humiliating themselves in these ways during civil litigation, weaker
plaintiffs can shame more powerful defendants and increase their chances of
eliciting an explanation for their injuries. At least where a plaintiff’s allegations
Peristiany ed., 1966) (“[T]o go to law for redress is to confess publicly that you have been
wronged[,] and the demonstration of your vulnerability places your honor in jeopardy, a
jeopardy from which the ‘satisfaction’ of legal compensation at the hands of a secular
authority hardly redeems it.”). But cf. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, supra note 43, at 340
(“A legal complaint is not, of course, just a whine . . . .”).
243
See supra note 161 and accompanying text; cf. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, supra
note 43, at 327-28 (depicting act of prosecuting tort action as “standing up for oneself” and
contrasting that with too readily accepting an apology).
244
I think it goes too far, however, to conclude that “court procedure . . . can do nothing
to restore your honour but merely advertises its plight.” Pitt-Rivers, supra note 242, at 30
(emphases added).
245
Intentional invasions of one’s own privacy thus express a kind of self-disrespect. Cf.
Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1533, 1536
(2017) (arguing that invasions of privacy sometimes express disrespect for their victims,
though focusing on social standing of groups rather than on individuals whose privacy is
invaded).
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are credible, the plaintiff’s self-humiliation can shame the defendant by calling
public attention both to the defendant’s original wrong and to his abuse of his
superior position to avoid having to provide the plaintiff compensation or at least
an explanation.246 With a plaintiff essentially accusing him of a kind of
exploitation, the defendant will likely feel compelled to address the gravamen
of the plaintiff’s allegations, rather than evade them or offer only a legalistic
response. Plaintiffs, to be clear, won’t necessarily win their cases simply by
shaming the defendant. But consistent with the claims of the dignitarian turn,
empirical research suggests that many plaintiffs file lawsuits to get explanations
as well as compensation,247 and shame may force a defendant to respond to a
demand for an explanation less dismissively.
To make all of this more concrete, consider a fairly run-of-the-mill products
liability lawsuit. A thirteen-year-old boy was helping his uncle with some
yardwork when the blade on the weed-trimming and brush-cutting device that
the uncle was using “struck something near the ground[,] which caused the
machine to swing violently around to [the uncle’s] left, cutting off [the boy’s]
right arm above the elbow.”248 Although doctors were able to reattach the boy’s
arm, he regained only “limited” use of his right hand and was left with a
“noticeable claw deformity.”249 The boy sought damages from the manufacturer
not only for his “quantifiable” medical expenses, but also for “pain and
suffering.”250 And in proving the latter damages, he dwelled in his pleadings and
deposition testimony on the fact that his “three operations ha[d] left noticeable
scars on his body, and the claw deformity of his right hand cause[d] people to
stare at him in public.”251 He sought to emphasize “the social problems which a
boy who was thirteen at the time of the injury has experienced and is likely to
experience as a result of such a disability.”252 The jury responded by awarding
him $1,000,000 in compensatory damages—well in excess of the roughly
$15,000 in medical expenses he had incurred—as well as another $1,000,000 in
punitive damages.253 Deliberately or not, the boy employed an expressive
246

Cf. Linda Radzik, Tort Processes and Relational Repair, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 47, at 231, 246-47 (arguing that, when tort
defendant proves “recalcitrant,” a damages award can “send [plaintiff] powerful messages
that counteract (though they do not erase) the insults and threats that may be suggested both
by [defendant’s] negligence and [by] his subsequent refusal to make satisfactory amends to
her”).
247
See, e.g., Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of
Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 701-02 (2007).
248
Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1454 (10th Cir. 1987). I am grateful to Ian
Ayres for suggesting this example.
249
Id. at 1454 n.1.
250
Id. at 1461.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id. at 1454, 1461 n.9.
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strategy similar to that in Miller’s shaming practices. Rather than simply recount
his physical injuries and their financial costs, he called public attention to the
ways in which those injuries had diminished his social status and, in doing so,
highlighted his new public image as a vulnerable, and somewhat pitiable, victim.
By using civil litigation to humiliate himself in this way, he could more
powerfully censure—or shame—the manufacturer for its breach of social
norms.254
One might doubt that, in modern circumstances, plaintiffs can typically shame
defendants through this kind of self-humiliation. For one thing, many of the
powerful parties from whom individual plaintiffs seek an explanation are
corporations rather than natural persons, and it might seem as though
corporations aren’t the kinds of agents that can be shamed. Some corporate-law
scholars, however, have argued that corporations, just like natural persons, have
reputational interests,255 and so are amenable to being shamed.256 That makes
sense given the preconditions for shaming. As explained above, in order to be
shamed, a party need only purport to subscribe to the principles of a certain
normative community and care about being perceived by the members of that
community as conforming to those principles—in Miller’s terms, the party must
have a sense of honor. Whether for reasons of profit or altruism, most
corporations do seek at least to appear to be honoring important social norms;
hence their responsiveness to publicity campaigns designed to pressure them to
254
One sees a similar kind of expressive dynamic at work in the “#MeToo” movement. In
explaining their decisions to come forward with their allegations of sexual harassment and
assault, at least some female victims have candidly acknowledged the trade-off between the
humiliation such publicity often entails and the potential for that humiliation to intensify
public opprobrium of the perpetrators’ conduct. See, e.g., Rachael Denhollander, Opinion,
The Price of Raising an Army, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2018, at SR2; Susan Dominus, Refusing
Hush Money, and Calling Out Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2017, at A1; Rebecca
Hamilton, Opinion, No, Naming Rapists Doesn’t Always Help, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2017,
at B01; Ronan Farrow, Weighing the Costs of Speaking Out About Harvey Weinstein, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/weighing-the-costsof-speaking-out-about-harvey-weinstein. But cf. Jessica A. Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo,
2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 37, 45-46 (describing how #MeToo has encouraged women to make
their accusations public); Resnik, Access, supra note 11, at 614 (offering, in contrast to some
victims’ more nuanced accounts, unambiguously celebratory interpretation of #MeToo as
“rebellion against secrecy”).
255
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 606 (2015) (discussing
how Apple is concerned with its reputation “for treating suppliers fairly”).
256
See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811,
1812 (2001); cf. Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 777-89 (2018)
(arguing that contempt findings against federal agencies have powerful shaming effects
because federal agency officials subscribe to strong norm of compliance with court orders).
But see Parrillo, supra, at 789-94 (noting limits on shaming effects of contempt findings).
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stop using exploitative labor practices, engaging in discrimination, associating
with objectionable spokespersons, and so on.257 Weaker plaintiffs can employ a
similar expressive strategy against corporations, albeit on a smaller scale, by
publicly humiliating themselves during their lawsuits. 258
For another thing, it might seem that many powerful actors, corporate or
otherwise, enjoy a degree of impunity in our unequal society that renders them
impervious to shame—shameless. This objection basically denies that powerful
parties even purport to subscribe to many of our society’s professed norms, such
that they could be shamed for flouting those norms.259 This impression gains
force from the burgeoning public-law literature on the corrosive effects of
increasing socioeconomic inequality on our political institutions. 260 With
powerful individuals and corporations exercising ever greater control over
public life, one might think they inhabit their own distinct normative
community, one that plays by a different set of rules. And yet, notwithstanding
the undeniable power of the wealthiest individuals and corporations, I don’t
think our society has yet reached the point where those actors are completely
shameless. Even the most rigidly hierarchical societies have norms that restrict
how the powerful treat the weak,261 and our imperfectly egalitarian society is no
different. Powerful parties can still be shamed for violating those norms—for
taking advantage of their superior position to insulate themselves from all
accountability for mistreating others. And civil litigation is one of the more
prominent venues in which such shaming can occur.262

257
See, e.g., Sharon Yadin, Saving Lives Through Shaming, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE
57, 58 (2019) (defending OSHA’s practice of publicly shaming companies that violate
workplace-safety regulations); Joe Silver, Shamed on Twitter, Corporations Do an AboutFace, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 21, 2014, 3:21 PM), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2014/04/shamed-on-twitter-corporations-do-an-about-face/ [https://perma.cc
/2R6Q-QEEH] (explaining how corporations change their unsavory practices after being
shamed on Twitter).
258
Cf. Scott Baker & Albert H. Choi, Reputation and Litigation: Why Costly Legal
Sanctions Can Work Better than Reputational Sanctions, 47 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 45, 46 (2018)
(arguing that imposing legal sanctions on firms through litigation can spur imposition of
informal reputational sanctions).
259
Cf. MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 104, at 134 (“One [must] be committed in a
serious way to the values and standards of the community in which one claim[s] membership
to feel shame (and to be shamed) for not measuring up to those standards or adhering to those
values.”).
260
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
261
See Whitman, Enforcing, supra note 72, at 1291 (describing “rules that generally forbid
us to glory in the social inferiority of particular classes of persons”).
262
A related objection questions whether the members of liberal, pluralistic, egalitarian
societies subscribe to a common set of norms, which is a prerequisite for shame. See LOCKE,
supra note 241, at 128. It seems, however, that even modern “liberal-democratic societies
possess values and commitments the persistent violation of which should properly cause
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If self-humiliation can have these expressive effects, then perhaps plaintiffs
should be more loath to insulate themselves from the indignities of civil
litigation. Indeed, by avoiding humiliation and safeguarding their dignity-asimage, plaintiffs may actually make it harder to reclaim their dignity-as-status.
Weaker plaintiffs are always at a material disadvantage vis-à-vis more powerful
defendants. But when they decline to humiliate themselves, they also put
themselves at an expressive disadvantage, forgoing the chance to shame the
defendant and to thereby raise the moral stakes of their confrontation. Shielding
oneself from humiliation thus comes with its own dignitarian cost, which must
be weighed against the dignitarian benefit of being spared some of the indignities
of civil litigation.
Not all humiliation, of course, is worth enduring, for not all humiliation has
the capacity to shame. Certain personal information may be merely
embarrassing, rather than highlighting the plaintiff’s injuries or general
powerlessness. While disclosing such information may end up humiliating the
plaintiff, if for no other reason than it undermines the public persona he or she
wishes to present, it won’t shame the defendant and thus will have no offsetting
dignitarian benefit. For many weaker plaintiffs, however, much of their personal
information pertains to their disadvantage and so will have the capacity to shame
the defendant if publicly disclosed.
To recognize that weaker plaintiffs can shame more powerful defendants by
humiliating themselves is by no means to deny the significant costs attending
that practice. Self-humiliation can, in fact, have profound, and in some cases
even emotionally debilitating, consequences for those who engage in it. To
humiliate oneself, one must present oneself as abject and in some sense weaker
than one’s target. As feminist scholars have explained, assuming that posture
(willingly or not) in legal proceedings can inflict a second injury on the victims
of wrongdoing—a “revictimization”—that prolongs and compounds the trauma
stemming from their original injury.263 The risk of revictimization is especially
acute for the members of systematically marginalized groups, such as racial
minorities and women, whose legal injuries are themselves often best
understood as affronts to dignity. 264
shame for its members.” Mark E. Button, Shame, Political Accountability, and the Ethical
Life of Politics, 47 POL. THEORY 391, 394 (2019) (book review); cf. SHARON KRAUSE,
LIBERALISM WITH HONOR 21-31 (2002) (attempting to reconcile concept of honor with
liberalism).
263
See generally, e.g., SUSAN EHRLICH, REPRESENTING RAPE: LANGUAGE AND SEXUAL
CONSENT 1 (2001) (analyzing how language used in sexual assault adjudication proceedings
can cause revictimization). On the related concept of “vulnerability” in feminist legal theory,
see generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW
ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS (2013).
264
Nor do I mean to suggest that shaming through self-humiliation is the only expressive
strategy available to the members of systematically marginalized groups. The Civil Rights
Movement, for example, famously employed a kind of mirror-image expressive strategy, in
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This all suggests that the potential expressive benefits of self-humiliation
won’t always justify the psychological and material costs. And the costs may
outweigh the benefits in precisely those cases in which the dignitarian stakes
seem to be the greatest. In this respect, the decision whether to engage in selfhumiliation resembles the decision whether to file a lawsuit in the first place: the
indignities of civil litigation may dissuade some victims of serious wrongdoing
from demanding explanations for their injuries, while the prospect of
revictimization (let alone self-revictimization) may prompt some of those
victims who do file suit to stick to more orthodox, but less expressively potent,
litigation strategies.
Turning to the other side of the “v,” one might object that shaming tactics can
never be justified because they’re inconsistent with defendants’ dignity. Just as
many scholars criticize shaming sanctions for violating criminal offenders’
dignity,265 so one might argue that allowing plaintiffs to shame defendants fails
to respect defendants’ standing as equals—even when defendants have taken
advantage of their superior position to avoid being held accountable. I can’t
definitively refute this objection without reconciling shame with dignity, which
I only begin to do in the next Section. For now, I’ll note that the dignitarian case
against shaming sanctions is much stronger than the dignitarian case against the
kind of shaming that occurs in the practices Miller discusses and their modern
analogues in civil litigation. For in contrast to shaming sanctions, shaming
rituals have their own built-in safeguard, since plaintiffs can shame defendants
only by humiliating themselves. This provides plaintiffs with a strong incentive
to attempt to shame defendants through self-humiliation only when their legal
claims are really worth it and they’re worried that more conventional legal
tactics will prove insufficient.266

which leaders, donning suits and ties, sought to present themselves not as weak or vulnerable,
but as more dignified than the white supremacists they were challenging. See Scott A.
Sandage, A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights Movement, and
the Politics of Memory, 1939-1963, 80 J. AM. HIST. 135, 136-37 (1993). That said, the
movement does seem to have occasionally resorted to the self-humiliation strategy as well.
See, e.g., Amia Srinivasan, Genealogy, Epistemology, and Worldmaking, 119 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 127, 146-47 n.32 (2019) (describing “Mamie Till’s decision to publicly
display the dead body of her [murdered] son [Emmett]” as “a bid to reclassify black boys as
vulnerable children rather than violent threats”). I am grateful to Professor Norm Spaulding
for pressing me on these deep and important questions, which deserve a much more extensive
treatment than I can offer here and which I look forward to exploring further in future work.
265
See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 98, at 230-33.
266
There are, by contrast, few meaningful legal checks on this kind of shaming strategy.
Most notably, litigants and their lawyers enjoy absolute immunity from tort liability for any
defamatory statements they make in court. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (AM.
LAW INST. 1977). This rule forecloses perhaps the most significant legal sanction for
attempting to spuriously shame a defendant. On the other hand, it also seems to presuppose
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3. Humiliation, Shame, and Legal Equality
The suggestion that plaintiffs should humiliate themselves in order to shame
defendants will no doubt have disconcerted many readers. Even assuming that
such self-humiliation has certain expressive benefits, it seems morally
problematic to expect, much less encourage, weaker plaintiffs to publicly
emphasize their lower status. In particular, highlighting the inequality of the
parties in a legal proceeding seems inconsistent with our society’s professed
commitment to legal equality, which requires that the law apply equally to
everyone, regardless of his or her socioeconomic status. That commitment
strongly resonates with the dignitarian turn in access-to-justice theory, for broad
access to justice is arguably required by a commitment to legal equality,267
which, in turn, is a corollary of the status-based conception of dignity that
underlies the dignitarian turn.268 To be sure, even as we subscribe to legal
equality, we can acknowledge that the ideal is realized only imperfectly in
practice.269 Civil procedure scholars have specifically noted the ways in which
material inequality can infect civil litigation and subvert legal equality, 270 and
they have accordingly advocated reforms that would mitigate some of the
resource disparities between parties.271 Notwithstanding the persistence of those
disparities, however, our legal system still aspires to treat all parties as equals,
an aspiration that seems to preclude the kind of expressive tactics considered in
the previous Section. There are at least two versions of this objection.
One version insists that the premises of shaming rituals are fundamentally
incompatible with a commitment to legal equality. For whereas legal equality
demands that everyone be treated as an equal, shame requires differences of
social status; it’s only insofar as a plaintiff is weaker than a defendant that
humiliating himself or herself will highlight his or her vulnerability and thereby
the existence and legitimacy of shaming during litigation. I am indebted to Professor George
Cohen for raising this issue.
267
See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: A Threat to the Rule of Law?, in PRIVATE LAW
AND THE RULE OF LAW 288, 289 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014) (“[A.V.]
Dicey also held equality before the law as a first principle of the rule of law: the same law
must apply to everyone, regardless of class or position. From this position we can infer that
people must have equal access to the courts to settle their disputes . . . .”); cf. JOSEPH RAZ,
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 217 (2d ed. 2009) (arguing that the rule of law requires that “[t]he
courts should be easily accessible”).
268
See WALDRON, supra note 70, at 57 (“We have adopted the idea of a single-status
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high-status individuals.” (footnote omitted)).
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shame the defendant. And yet, these two propositions aren’t as contradictory as
they might initially seem. The ideal of legal equality requires legal institutions
not to eliminate all socioeconomic inequalities but to transcend them. It’s “the
ideal that we are mutually answerable to one another, regardless of station,”272
not that we all necessarily occupy the same “station.” A legal system can honor
the principle of legal equality while tolerating at least some disparities in
socioeconomic status so long as it decides disputes based on the merits of the
legal claims rather than the identities of the parties. A commitment to legal
equality can thus coexist with the inequalities on which shaming rituals
depend.273
But this gives rise to a second version of the objection: even if legal equality
doesn’t require the eradication of all socioeconomic inequality, legal institutions
must ignore the latter in order to comply with the former. Legal equality requires
blindness to differences of social rank,274 yet shaming rituals seek to highlight
them. Indeed, humiliating oneself in the context of a legal dispute seems to
offend one’s own dignity, for one shouldn’t have to degrade oneself to compel
someone else to honor his or her obligations.275 That principle applies with
special force to members of systematically marginalized social groups who have
suffered and are seeking to redress some of the most egregious dignitary harms.
Inviting such individuals to humiliate themselves in the legal process is not just
unfair, but seems only to add insult to injury.
These concerns are serious, and they strike me as dispositive in ideal social
conditions, where socioeconomic inequality has either been eliminated or at
least rendered less salient. But in nonideal circumstances,276 where
socioeconomic inequality too often translates into political power, it seems less
objectionable to highlight differences of social status as a means of
counteracting them. Legal equality may even require a legal system operating
amid significant socioeconomic inequality to afford socially weaker individuals
an opportunity to highlight their plight at the hands of the more powerful.
272

Hershovitz, supra note 27, at 103.
But see Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1021, 1023
(2014) (arguing that principle of legal equality itself requires greater socioeconomic equality);
Jonathan Wolff, Equality and Hierarchy, 119 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 17-19 (2019)
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Cf. Anderson, supra note 66, at 313 (“To stand as an equal before others in discussion
means that . . . no one need bow and scrape before others or represent themselves as inferior
to others as a condition of having their claim heard.”); Wolff, supra note 129, at 107 (“It is
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The contrary intuition conflates two distinct ways in which a legal system
might attend to socioeconomic inequality: First, a legal system might formally
or effectively immunize powerful actors from legal accountability. This
obviously contravenes the principle of legal equality, in ideal and nonideal
conditions alike. Second, a legal system might allow weaker parties to publicly
emphasize their vulnerability in order to more effectively assert their entitlement
to equal treatment under the law, including their right to call others to account
for the legal wrongs committed against them. Although allowing such practices
is by definition to concede society’s failure to conform to ideal principles of
justice, they seem to be an important way of mediating the gap between society’s
commitment to legal equality and the fact of socioeconomic inequality. 277 That
is the kind of attention to socioeconomic inequality involved in the shaming
practices analyzed by Miller and their analogues in contemporary civil litigation.
B.

Embracing the Publicity of Civil Litigation

This Section reconsiders the doctrinal issues explored in Part II in light of
civil litigation’s capacity to shame. The ability of weaker plaintiffs to shame
more powerful defendants by humiliating themselves during a lawsuit only
further complicates the dignitarian valence of each of those issues, along with
standard tenets of access-to-justice theory. Insofar as we accept the dignitarian
turn’s invitation to consider the expressive dimension of civil litigation, we
should be willing to revisit, if not necessarily repudiate, orthodox access-tojustice positions on a range of procedural questions.
1. The Humiliation Privilege
Most straightforwardly, the ability of weaker plaintiffs to shame more
powerful defendants provides a new justification for publicity in civil litigation.
As an expressive social practice, such shaming works only when plaintiffs
humiliate themselves in public, since other members of the relevant normative
community must be able to perceive a plaintiff’s disadvantage vis-à-vis the
defendant. Sealed filings, protective orders in discovery, confidential settlement
agreements, and secret arbitration all thwart self-humiliation by shielding
plaintiffs’ personal information from public view; broad publicity in civil
litigation facilitates self-humiliation and thus augments the shaming effects of
weaker plaintiffs’ lawsuits. This expressive justification for publicity in civil
litigation differs from the more utilitarian justifications offered by access-tojustice scholars, who tend to emphasize publicity’s systemic benefits and to
insist that plaintiffs simply bear any concomitant dignitarian costs (insofar as
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they even acknowledge such costs).278 An expressive defense, by contrast,
emphasizes the potential benefits of publicity for plaintiffs themselves.
Of course, realizing those benefits isn’t painless for plaintiffs. Weaker
plaintiffs can shame more powerful defendants in order to more effectively
assert their dignity-as-status, but only by humiliating themselves and
compromising their dignity-as-image in the process.
Given this trade-off, plaintiffs should be able to choose whether to
deliberately violate their own privacy in an effort to shame the defendant. The
current rules governing publicity in civil litigation largely deny plaintiffs that
choice, generally allowing defendants and courts to set the terms on which
plaintiffs’ personal information is publicly disclosed.279 Whereas many accessto-justice scholars now advocate nearly total publicity in civil litigation, a
choice-based approach would afford plaintiffs greater control over how much of
their personal information gets disseminated beyond the court and immediate
parties to the lawsuit. Here I briefly consider one possible arrangement for
institutionalizing such control.
The arrangement I envision would reverse the default rule of publicity in civil
litigation, so that all of a plaintiff’s personal information (or at least certain
predefined categories of especially sensitive information) would be withheld
from the public record unless the plaintiff affirmatively chose to disclose it or to
make the underlying facts to which it pertained part of his or her public case. 280
Although this would undermine plaintiffs’ dignity-as-status somewhat by
dampening the expressive effects of civil litigation, it would allow them to
preserve their dignity-as-image. At the same time, plaintiffs could opt out of the
privacy default, and thereby tap into civil litigation’s expressive potential, by
publicly revealing some of their personal information when they judged that
doing so might shame the defendant. This proposal would thus function in a
manner similar to the federal rape-shield law. As applied in civil cases, that rule
generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of a sex-offense victim’s
278

See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
For recent examples, see generally Kiwewa v. Postmaster General, No. 18-3807, 2019
WL 4122013 (6th Cir. Mar. 26, 2019) (denying employment-discrimination plaintiff’s motion
to seal district court record on appeal); and Patrick Dorrian, Massage Parlor Patron Suing
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decisions have expanded public access to documents filed during civil litigation. See, e.g.,
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[2019] UKSC 38, [2019] 3 WLR 429 (determining court’s jurisdiction under Civil Procedure
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“reputation” unless the victim “place[s] it in controversy.”281 A privacy default
would extend a weaker version of this protection to all of a plaintiff’s personal
information, and would govern pretrial discovery as well as the introduction of
evidence at trial. The protection would be weaker because plaintiffs would be
able to withhold their personal information only from the public, not from the
defendant or the court; nor would they be able to prevent the defendant from
using the information in the litigation.
One can thus understand this proposal as a kind of qualified humiliation
privilege. As with any privilege, plaintiffs could keep certain personal
information secret unless they took steps to waive the privilege, yet the privilege
would be only qualified because the information could still be used in the course
of resolving the dispute, just out of public view. Such an approach would better
protect plaintiffs’ dignity-as-image than our current civil justice system does
while allowing them to publicly humiliate themselves when that tactic might be
to their advantage.282
The most significant legal hurdle that even a qualified humiliation privilege
would have to surmount is the First Amendment, at least as currently construed.
Lower courts have interpreted the First Amendment (and related common law
doctrines) to create a strong presumption of publicity in civil litigation and to
permit secrecy only in very limited circumstances.283 Imposing a privacy default
with a publicity opt-out would likely run afoul of that understanding. Although
a comprehensive First Amendment analysis is beyond the scope of this Article,
it’s worth noting that the arguments for publicity are weaker in the civil context
281

FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2). To protect the victim’s privacy, the rule also establishes
special confidential procedures for determining the admissibility of such evidence. F ED. R.
EVID. 412(c).
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Plaintiffs’ control under a humiliation privilege would have to be limited somewhat to
account for the most significant systemic effects of their individual decisions to keep
information private. Cf., e.g., Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 76, 76 (2018) (advocating proposal that would permit general use of nondisclosure
agreements (“NDAs”) in settlement of sexual-misconduct claims, but would require such
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is later accused by another individual). But see Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 181, at
189-207 (arguing that courts should apply contract law’s public policy doctrine to refuse to
enforce most NDAs in sexual-misconduct cases, given significant externalities generated by
such agreements). In addition, due process would demand that defendants be permitted to
invoke the privilege on similar terms as plaintiffs. And even putting due process concerns
aside, a humiliation privilege would have to account for the fact that it might induce wouldbe defendants to use the joinder rules or declaratory-judgment remedy to claim the privilege’s
protections by designating themselves formally as plaintiffs. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text. But again, following the dignitarian turn, I am not focusing in this Article
on the dignitarian interests of parties who are typically defendants.
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See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 182, at 836 (examining history of publicity
in court proceedings); Ardia, Privacy, supra note 136, at 1385 (criticizing “categorical
exclusion” of certain information from court records).
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than in the criminal context, where the constitutional right to public access
originated.284 For whereas in the criminal context the government exercises the
state’s coercive power in an effort to deprive citizens of their physical liberty, in
the civil context other private parties generally invoke that power (subject to
judicial oversight) to demand answers and a remedy.285 There is thus a
correspondingly diminished imperative to involve the public in the civil process
and should be wider latitude to accommodate plaintiffs’ privacy interests. This
isn’t to deny that the public has significant interests in obtaining information
produced through civil litigation, but a more nuanced understanding of the civil
process would afford more room to balance those interests with litigant privacy
than current categorical constructions of the First Amendment allow.
Even a qualified humiliation privilege, moreover, would still permit greater
publicity than the current arbitration regime. As explained in Part II, most
arbitration proceedings are conducted in total secrecy, and the parties are
sometimes even forbidden to publicize what occurs during the proceedings as
well as the details of the dispute. Arbitration can thus deprive would-be plaintiffs
of any meaningful opportunity to publicly humiliate themselves in an effort to
shame their opponents. To be sure, a would-be plaintiff bent on publicity could
seek vacatur or oppose confirmation of an adverse arbitral award, proceedings
that occur in open court and produce a public record. But the record in such
proceedings comprises only a very limited set of materials,286 and in any event,
seeking vacatur or opposing confirmation is rarely worth the candle given the
strict limits on judicial review of final arbitral awards. So not only do
confidentiality rules insulate arbitration from public accountability, as accessto-justice scholars have rightly noted; they also strip would-be plaintiffs of their
most potent expressive weapon. A qualified humiliation privilege, by contrast,
would afford plaintiffs some of the privacy benefits of arbitration while still
allowing them to exploit the indignities of civil litigation.287
2. Other Potential Expressive Doctrines
Short of supporting a generally applicable humiliation privilege, the previous
Section’s expressive insights also suggest more modest adjustments to specific
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procedural doctrines. Before deciding whether to adopt such reforms, we would,
of course, have to assess their potential consequences for other values besides
dignity, as well as their material effects. But it’s worth at least pondering how
the value of dignity, in all its complexity, might challenge prevailing
assumptions in access-to-justice theory about which procedural rules and
practices empower plaintiffs.
The Expressive Dimension of the Civil Complaint. Appreciating the ability of
weaker plaintiffs to shame more powerful defendants by humiliating themselves
reveals a potentially pro-plaintiff effect of the Supreme Court’s plausibility
pleading standard. Most civil procedure scholars have focused on pleading’s
traditional functions of giving defendants notice of the claims against them and
efficiently sorting potentially meritorious claims from frivolous ones.288 From
that practical perspective, the plausibility standard is an unmitigated boon for
defendants, since it requires plaintiffs to include more factual allegations in
support of their claims in their complaints before being permitted to proceed to
discovery.
But from an expressive perspective, the plausibility standard may have a less
obvious upside for plaintiffs, too. Part II showed how that standard
(paternalistically) protects plaintiffs’ dignity-as-image by limiting the duration
of any humiliation they must suffer when their claims are unlikely to succeed.
At the same time, though, it can amplify the intensity of the humiliation they
suffer at the outset of the litigation and thus enhance the shaming power of the
civil complaint. To satisfy the standard, a complaint must “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’”289 Although this standard purports to restrict plaintiffs’ access to
discovery,290 it does so by incentivizing plaintiffs to plead more facts in support
of their legal claims. Plaintiffs, to be sure, weren’t limiting themselves to the
barest “short and plain statement” of their claims under the old notice-pleading
regime.291 But at the margin, the plausibility standard encourages plaintiffs to
include additional allegations they might otherwise omit, particularly allegations
that, while supportive of their claims, concern sensitive matters they are loath to
make public. Those additional allegations can augment the expressive power of
the civil complaint. More specifically, by complying with the plausibility
standard, plaintiffs can enhance both of the components of a shaming ritual
analyzed by Miller: pleading additional facts about their disadvantage
undermines their self-presentation and thus intensifies their self-humiliation,
while pleading additional facts about the defendant’s wrongdoing and
288
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recalcitrance intensifies his shame. Ironically, an ostensibly pro-defendant
pleading standard might actually end up strengthening the expressive hand of
some plaintiffs.
This is by no means to deny the plausibility standard’s potential to
illegitimately deprive deserving plaintiffs of access to discovery. Indeed, the
plausibility standard threatens to inflict its own kind of dignitarian harm on
plaintiffs, for having one’s potentially legitimate grievances rejected
prematurely as implausible can be understood as a failure by the courts to take
seriously one’s standing as an equal entitled to an explanation.292 The point isn’t
that the plausibility standard unambiguously favors plaintiffs, but that it might
have one significant pro-plaintiff effect—an effect we miss if we focus on the
standard’s practical consequences alone.
Even putting practical consequences to one side, a universal heightened
pleading standard remains a problematic way of enhancing the civil complaint’s
expressive force. For just as the plausibility standard paternalistically protects
plaintiffs’ dignity-as-image by cutting their humiliation short when their claims
are weak, so, too, does it paternalistically strengthen their demand for
recognition of their dignity-as-status by essentially requiring them to include
more potentially humiliating information in their complaints in order to proceed
to discovery. The standard effectively forces plaintiffs to humiliate themselves,
on pain of having their claims prematurely rejected as implausible.
A pleading regime more respectful of plaintiffs’ dignity might allow plaintiffs
to elect different pleading standards, depending on their willingness to make
their allegations public.293 If, for example, they wanted to keep their allegations
private in order to avoid humiliation, they would have to satisfy the plausibility
standard. This option would allow plaintiffs to protect their dignity-as-image in
exchange for forgoing the civil complaint’s expressive potential and risking a
premature dismissal of their claims. Alternatively, if they were willing to make
their allegations public, they would have to satisfy only a laxer “notice pleading”
standard.294 They could then choose whether to include sensitive personal
information in their publicly available complaints, humiliating themselves in an
attempt to shame the defendant, or to omit such information and severely limit
both the credibility and the expressive force of their allegations. Such a
bifurcated pleading regime would give plaintiffs greater say in trading off their
dignity-as-status against their dignity-as-image, rather than having the state
effectively make the choice for them.

292

See supra text accompanying note 168.
Cf. Nagareda, supra note 209 (proposing bifurcated pleading standard for lawsuits
based on public and private information).
294
Cf. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (stating that “simplified ‘notice pleading’
is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures
established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to
define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues”).
293

576

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:501

The Timidity of Aggregate Litigation. For the same reasons that civil
litigation’s shaming potential strengthens the access-to-justice case for publicity
in civil procedure, it also complicates the access-to-justice case for class actions.
Access-to-justice scholars defend class actions primarily as a means of
aggregating claims that aren’t worth prosecuting individually. As explained in
Part II, with that aggregation comes a degree of anonymity for the absent class
members, who can largely rely on the named plaintiffs to divulge any personal
information necessary to establish the defendant’s liability to the class. While
this anonymity protects the absent class members’ dignity-as-image, it also
deprives them of the chance to publicly humiliate themselves and to thereby
augment the shaming effects of the litigation beyond whatever compromising
information the named plaintiffs choose to disclose. The flipside of the
anonymity of aggregate litigation is thus a form of timidity, as absent class
members preserve their privacy by free-riding on the willingness of the named
plaintiffs to expose themselves to public scrutiny.
None of this, of course, is a reason to dispense with aggregate litigation or to
make it more difficult to certify class actions, as recent Supreme Court decisions
have attempted to do.295 After all, in many cases, class actions provide the only
viable avenue for seeking any kind of relief. But we should nevertheless consider
the dignitarian effects of class actions in structuring aggregate litigation, so that
absent class members can enjoy the practical benefits of aggregation while
preserving the opportunity to reap some of the expressive advantages of
individual litigation. One possibility would be to make greater use of opt-in class
actions, as opposed to the currently favored opt-out class actions. The Supreme
Court has suggested that due process requires that absent class members be given
an opportunity to opt out of a class action, at least where the action is “wholly
or predominantly for money judgments.”296 Consistent with these statements,
class actions certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the rule
governing nonmandatory class actions and the primary means of certifying class
actions seeking money damages, must afford absent class members the right to
opt out.297 Many civil procedure scholars prefer this arrangement to a
requirement that potential class members opt in on the ground that opt-out rights
result in larger classes than would be certified under an opt-in regime, since the
typical class member is unlikely to take the affirmative steps necessary to join
the litigation.298
As an expressive matter, however, opt-in class actions have certain
advantages over opt-out class actions—advantages that might outweigh the
295

See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011).
296
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985); see also Wal-Mart, 564
U.S. at 362-63; Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 n.24 (1999).
297
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
298
See Dodson, supra note 221, at 184-86.

2020]

THE INDIGNITIES OF CIVIL LITIGATION

577

practical benefits of an opt-out regime (depending, of course, on the magnitude
of those benefits). In particular, requiring potential class members to opt in
eliminates, or at least reduces, the anonymity of aggregate litigation. Rather than
be included in the class automatically, prospective class members must come
forward, identify themselves, reveal any personal information necessary to
establish their membership in the class, and affirmatively choose to join the
litigation.299 The class members can exploit this moment of publicity to shape
the expressive valence of the lawsuit by revealing personal information that
emphasizes their lower status and thus shames the defendant. When combined
with the disclosures of the other prospective class members who choose to join
the litigation, this self-humiliation can significantly amplify the litigation’s
expressive effects beyond those of an opt-out class action. To be sure, depending
on the substantive cause of action, class certification and the defendant’s liability
may sometimes be established using statistical or other representative evidence,
rather than information particular to any individual class member. 300 But in
many cases an opt-in requirement will force prospective class members who
wish to join the litigation to reveal information they might otherwise want to
keep private—an opportunity for self-humiliation that can endow aggregate
litigation with some of the expressive power of individual litigation.
One might worry that requiring absent class members to opt in leaves them
with little choice but to subject themselves to humiliation. Although they can
technically avoid the publicity that attends opting in by forgoing the litigation
altogether, it seems unreasonable to demand that they abjure their right to a
portion of any class-wide relief in order to maintain their dignity-as-image. The
better dignitarian compromise would be to give them some say over the structure
of the litigation and, specifically, the extent to which it protects their privacy. In
this respect, appreciating the cross-cutting dignitarian effects of aggregate
litigation bolsters Professor Scott Dodson’s proposal to give prospective class
members an option to have a class certified on either an opt-out or an opt-in
basis.301 Such an arrangement would allow prospective class members to
collectively (if not individually) balance the benefits to their dignity-as-image
from the anonymity associated with an opt-out regime against the costs to their
dignity-as-status from avoiding the publicity associated with having to opt in.
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CONCLUSION
From a dignitarian perspective, civil litigation poses a dilemma for plaintiffs.
On the one hand, as some civil procedure scholars have recently begun to
suggest, civil litigation can promote one aspect of plaintiffs’ dignity, by allowing
them to call those who have wronged them to account. On the other hand, along
the way, civil litigation can undermine another aspect of plaintiffs’ dignity, by
forcing them to reveal personal information that is inconsistent with their public
image and that they’d rather not share. Appreciating this dilemma complicates
standard access-to-justice positions regarding not only secrecy in civil litigation,
but also several other procedural issues—each of which potentially presents a
trade-off between the two aspects of plaintiffs’ dignity. The dilemma can’t be
resolved as a categorical matter. But at least in conditions of socioeconomic
inequality, weaker plaintiffs can seize on the indignities of civil litigation to
more effectively assert their standing as equals. It turns out that an institution
that aspires to legal equality can more fully realize that ideal amid
socioeconomic inequality by allowing plaintiffs to publicly call attention to their
weakness—to humiliate themselves.
This complex dignitarian account of civil litigation holds important lessons
for civil procedure, as well as for legal and political theory. For civil procedure
scholars, it should sound a note of caution. I agree—and have argued
elsewhere302—that civil procedure scholarship would indeed benefit from
greater attention to concepts from political theory, including dignity. Among
other things, justifying civil litigation in dignitarian terms reveals that civil
procedure has its own “expressive economy.” 303 While debates over various
procedural practices (understandably)304 tend to focus largely on practical costs
and benefits, equally important are the values those practices express—what
they say about the kind of society in which we live. But civil procedure’s
expressive dimension turns out to be more complicated than proponents of the
dignitarian turn seem to think. In developing a theoretical account of civil
procedure, then, we can’t just import concepts from political theory wholesale,
but must instead consider how those ideals are instantiated in and shaped by our
society’s institutions as they actually exist. 305
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The corresponding lesson for political theorists is that, while there is of course
an essential role for ideal theory, it is also important to develop accounts of
fundamental political concepts such as dignity for extant institutions. 306 It may
well be that one important aspect of a status-based conception of dignity is legal
equality, and that in ideal social conditions, legal equality requires blindness to
differences of social status. In conditions of socioeconomic inequality, however,
we may need to highlight those differences to better approximate the principle
of equality before the law. In this respect, civil procedure confirms the more
general insight that, in order to overcome our society’s imperfections, we may
need to confront them more directly first. 307
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